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Abstract: Prospect theory describes how people evaluate decisions under risk. I modify 
prospect theory to account for how ex-post surprise affects an individual’s evaluation of 
subsequent prospects. Based on this adaptation of prospect theory, I hypothesize that 
unexpected outcomes yield greater utility or disutility compared to expected outcomes 
due to expectations-based reference points.  The effect surprise has on utility should 
manifest itself in terms of risk preferences and ex-post reference point shift. Two 
experiments are conducted to measure the effect of surprise on utility, risk preferences, 
and reference point shift. Data is collected from undergraduate students at Lake Forest 
College. The results show evidence for expectations-based reference points, utility of 
surprise outcomes is greater than expected outcomes, and reference point shift is faster in 
surprise outcomes. Refinements to the experimental protocols are explored to inform 
future research. Policy implications concerning financial markets, marketing, and general 
decision-making are discussed. 
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I. Introduction 
 There is a reason why adding the word “surprisingly” to the words good or bad 
enhances their meanings. Surprising outcomes elicit greater responses than expected 
outcomes.  That is why we wrap presents and hold surprise parties; the surprise makes the 
outcome better.  The feeling of bad outcomes is also enhanced by surprise; if someone 
cannot make it to a party you are hosting, it feels much worse if they do not tell you 
ahead of time.  In economic terms surprising outcomes generate more utility or disutility 
than expected outcomes.  
 Evidence that surprise increases the utility of an outcome in the direction of the 
surprise has been noted in several different fields (Vanhamme and Snelders 2001; Chang 
2011). However, research into how surprise affects decision-making behavior after the 
surprise occurs is relatively limited. If surprise affects behavior to a large enough degree, 
there are important implications for corporate policy, public policy, and individual well-
being. For example, several studies already suggest that surprise affects investor behavior 
in a variety of settings (Ball and Brown 1968; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Chang 2011). 
Therefore it is worthwhile to determine precisely how surprise may affect decision-
making behavior.   
 The theoretical framework for my investigation into surprise is based on prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect theory is one of the most widely 
accepted theories explaining how people make decisions under risk. In summary, 
prospect theory states that people are more risky when they face losses, less risky when 
they face gains, and that the perception of whether an outcome is a loss or gain depends 
on one’s reference point. I adapt this theory so that prior outcomes affect how people 
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evaluate future decisions, accounting for the effect surprise has on the utility of those 
prior outcomes. I argue that positive surprises cause future prospects to be evaluated 
further into the domain of gain, thereby reducing risk-seeking. Likewise, negative 
surprises cause future prospects to be evaluated further into the domain of loss, thereby 
increasing risk-seeking.   
 I will test for the validity of my claim using two experiments. The first is based on 
an experiment first performed by Arkes et al. (2008) during their investigation into how 
expectations affect reference point formation. The second is based on an experiment first 
performed by Holt and Laury (2002) during their investigation into what affects risk 
preferences. I modify the experiments in order to look specifically at how surprise 
outcomes affect behavior in subsequent decisions.  
 The structure of my thesis is the following. To begin, I discuss the motivation for 
this research. Then I summarize the development of theories about individual decision-
making behavior. Next I explain the methods of how to test my claim in terms of what 
results will provide evidence supporting my theory. I then show how the two experiments 
I have chosen to conduct will prompt the behaviors that could support my theory. Next I 
describe how the experiments went in reality, and the results of those experiments. 
Finally, I discuss the results, make conclusions based on those results, discuss how my 
model and methods can be improved for future research, outline potential policy 
implications of my results, and make my concluding statements.  
II. Literature Review 
A. Motivation 
In order to conceptualize how surprise affects behavior, it is easiest to begin by 
considering surprise on the personal scale. By studying purchase experience diaries and 
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questionnaires about purchase experiences, Vanhamme and Snelders (2001) show that 
surprise plays an important role in consumer satisfaction.  In particular, products which 
give the consumer some sort of positive surprise yield customers the highest utility, and 
products which give the consumer some sort of negative surprise yield the lowest utility. 
Vanhamme and Snelders provide several explanations for why positive and negative 
surprises enhance or reduce respectively the satisfaction a consumer experiences.  They 
argue that the initial arousal of surprise “contaminates” the emotions following the 
surprise, enhancing or diminishing the overall experience.  
Surprises also have significant effects on financial markets. Not only are there 
several terms used in the world of finance that refer specifically to the unique behaviors 
which result from surprises, there are also strategies used by both firms and governments 
which blatantly take into account the fact that surprise is affecting behavior. 
First, consider the phenomenon known as post-earnings-announcement drift, or 
PEAD.  This effect, first documented by Ball and Brown (1968), causes stock prices to 
consistently drift in the direction of an earnings surprise.  That is, if the earnings a 
company reports are larger than what was predicted, the price of that company’s stock 
will continue to go up for at least 60 days after the earnings announcement.  If reported 
earnings are below what was predicted, the price of that company’s stock will continue to 
fall for at least 60 days (Bernard and Thomas 1989). In this case, an earnings surprise has 
a direct short term effect on investor behavior toward that company.  Given that stock 
prices update with new information in a matter of minutes and even seconds, (Busse and 
Green 2002), it is unlikely that PEAD is a result of prices updating with new information. 
There has been significant discourse as to why PEAD occurs (Bernard and Thomas 1989; 
Shane and Brous 2001), but there is yet to be a general consensus. 
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Kasznik and Lev (1995) find that firms will strategically choose when to disclose 
earnings forecasts due to the effect of earnings surprises on investor behavior.  In 
particular, Kasznik and Lev find that a company is more likely to release an earnings 
forecast if they are facing long term structural losses. One explanation for this behavior is 
that large, long-term structural losses are especially discouraging to investors if the losses 
are surprising, so it is better to warn investors of these losses ahead of time.   
Chang (2011) shows that unexpected monetary policy changes affect financial 
markets more than expected monetary policy changes. In particular, Chang shows that 
unexpected contractionary policies have a larger negative effect on the returns to real 
estate investment trusts (REIT) as compared to expected changes.  Because the money 
supply and interest rates play such a critical role in the global economy, surprise 
monetary policy changes may have an expanding ripple effect which affects other areas 
of the economy. 
 Several studies by psychologists and neurologists have also shown that surprises 
cause measurable changes in behavior.  For example, Rescorla and Wagner (1972) find 
that conditioning speed, or the speed at which an individual is trained to respond to a 
given stimulus, is affected greatly by whether one was expecting that stimulus.  The 
Rescorla-Wagner model is defined mathematically as the following. Let V represent the 
agent’s associative value of the stimuli prior to an unconditioned stimulus. Let λ 
represent the unconditioned stimulus itself. Therefore, (λ-V) represents the difference 
between what happens and what one expected. Let k equal a constant for the salience of 
the stimuli. Finally, let ∆V represent the change in the associative value of an 
unconditioned stimulus.  Learning is the reduction of the difference between what one 
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expects will happen and what will actually happen.  Therefore the amount one has 
learned in a certain trial is: 
∆V=k(λ-V) 
The difference between λ and V will be very large at the beginning of the learning 
process, but that difference will become smaller and approach zero as one learns 
precisely the association between a given stimulus and its outcome. If surprise has an 
influence on how behaviors are learned and reinforced, then it is possible surprise could 
affect economic decision-making in games of repeated rounds with incomplete 
information, as the relationship between a certain choice and outcome may be reinforced 
at varying rates depending on the level of surprise.  
Blanchard and Honig (1976) also investigate factors in the speed of conditioning 
behavior and find that a stimulus which is a surprise is more effective compared to non-
surprising stimuli in reinforcing behaviors.  They reach this conclusion after finding 
subjects who were surprised by their rewards exhibit conditioned behavior more readily 
than subjects who were not surprised by their rewards.  A result found by Donchin (1981) 
not only supports the conclusion made by Blanchard and Honig concerning the impact 
surprise has on reinforcement of behavior, but goes further to make another conclusion. 
That is, learning only occurs if the behavior one is trying to learn is elicited by a 
surprising stimulus.  In other words, one will only store the information of an event if that 
event is surprising, because it is through surprises that one is able to adjust models of the 
environment.  In the context of economic decision-making, whether one can make sense 
of a surprise outcome may influence their next decision given the hindsight bias or lack 
thereof concerning the outcome of the previous surprise.  
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Pezzo (2003) makes a similar finding concerning the role that surprise has on 
behavior. Pezzo argues that surprises trigger a “sense-making” process whose outcome 
can affect hindsight bias, or the feeling that an unpredictable outcome was predictable 
after the outcome had passed.  If one is successful in making sense of an unexpected 
outcome, then hindsight bias is increased as one can make the connections between the 
previous conditions and the outcome. If one is unsuccessful in making sense of the 
outcome then hindsight bias is decreased as one was unable to make the connections 
between previous conditions and the outcome. The result of the sense-making process 
and its subsequent effect on hindsight bias could potentially affect future decisions 
because hindsight bias may create a perception of lower uncertainty or risk.  To illustrate 
this idea, consider an investor who decides to invest in what he believed to be a safe stock.  
Then, that stock unexpectedly crashes.  If the investor is able to successfully make sense 
of why the stock crashed, he might try investing again as he believes to have a better 
understanding of why the stock crashed and could avoid the conditions which led to that 
outcome. If he is unsuccessful in explaining the crash, then he might not invest again (at 
least in the stock he originally invested in or ones similar to it) in order to avoid the risk 
of another unexpected loss.  
The ways in which surprises can affect behavior are clearly numerous. On the 
small scale, surprise is shown to affect behavior, and specifically the way in which we 
learn and perceive the connections between certain conditions and certain outcomes.  On 
the large scale, surprise affects behavior in financial markets whose outcomes can 
influence several aspects of life in modern industrialized societies. Considering both the 
small scale and large scale observed effects of surprise on behavior, it is important to 
have a model which can precisely describe behavior in the context of surprise.  In order 
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to begin discussing a model which accounts for the effect that surprise has on decision-
making behavior, it is necessary to first outline the development of prior pertinent models 
of decision-making behavior.   
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B. Models of decision-making behavior 
 Standard microeconomics, assumes two things: (1) economic agents are rational 
in that they make decisions to maximize utility based on personal preferences, and (2) 
people have full information of their environment and options when making decisions.  
Given these assumptions, decisions to consume adhere to four axioms (Autor, 2010). 
1. Completeness: For every A and B either A ≽ B, B ≽ A or A ~ B. Individuals 
have fully defined preferences. 
2. Transitivity: If A ≽ B, and B ≽ C, then A ≽ C. Individuals are consistent in 
their preferences. 
3. Strong Monotonicity: In simpler terms, more is always better. If bundle A has 
more X and/or Y than bundle B, then A is preferred to B.   
4. Diminishing Marginal Utility: Marginal utility of consumption decreases as 
total consumption increases for each good in any given bundle.  
In situations of simply deciding to consume between two goods, standard 
microeconomics provides an effective model for explaining decision-making behavior. 
When it comes to decisions under uncertainty or decisions that involve risk, the model 
loses its predictive power. For example, one of the assumptions of the standard model is 
that people have full information of their environment. This is not always the case. The 
standard model also does not discuss how people analyze choices which involve risk. For 
example, the model cannot show why people decide to gamble or how they gamble when 
they are forced to do so.  The inherent weakness of the standard model of rational 
behavior in its ability to more realistically explain decisions under risk or uncertainty has 
led to the development of several models which do account for risk and uncertainty.   
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Simply using expected value to represent the utility one receives from a gamble 
implies that people are neutral with regard to risk. For some people this may be true, but 
it can be plainly observed that some people are risk averse, and others are risk-seeking. 
Therefore, levels of risk may affect the utility one receives when faced with gambles.  In 
other words, a risk averse person may get utility from the simple guarantee that their 
wealth will increase.  A risk-seeking person may get utility simply from the potential to 
have a large increase in wealth.  Expected utility theory takes the effects that levels of 
risk have on utility into account.   
The assumptions of standard microeconomic theory also apply to expected utility 
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1956). Additionally, expected utility theory 
requires two more axioms:  
1. Independence: If A ≽ B and p∈(0,1), then p(A) + (1-p)C ≽ p(B) + (1-p)C. 
Introducing an independent gamble does not change the preference ordering 
of two things had the gamble not been there.  
2.  Continuity: If A ≽ B ≽ C, then there is a probability p such that p(B) ≈ p(A) 
+ (1-p)(C). There is a lottery for B such that one is indifferent between the 
lottery for B and a mixed lottery of A and C. 
If these axioms hold, then the mathematical representation of how risk levels 
affect utility according to expected utility theory is as follows. Let p represent the 
distribution of probabilities of outcomes, pi represent the probability of xi happening, u(xi) 
represent the utility of xi, and U(p) represent the utility of the gamble as a whole. 
U(p)=∑u(xi) ∗ pi 
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 Using this model, the differences in utility from levels of risk can be captured. For 
example, consider a situation where one has a 50/50 chance to win $100 or $0, or one can 
simply take a guaranteed $50.  A risk-seeking individual would receive greater utility 
from taking the gamble. Mathematically, this is represented as 0.5[u(100)]+0.5[u(0)] > 
u(50). A risk averse individual would receive greater utility from taking the guaranteed 
$50, or 0.5[u(100)]+0.5[u(0)] < u(50).  The utility of risk as suggested by expected utility 
theory is represented graphically in Figure 1.  Let X represent a certain level of expected 
wealth gain, U(x) represent the utility of the gamble, E[U(x)] represent the expected 
utility of getting X, and CE represent the certainty equivalent, or the value of an outcome 
which yields the same expected utility as X. 
Figure 1: Expected Utility Theory Value Functions 
 
 Figure 1 shows the value functions of risk averse, risk neutral, and risk-seeking 
individuals as hypothesized by expected utility theory.  According to the figure, the risk 
averse individual would receive relatively high utility from outcome X. However, the 
expected utility of outcome X is lower than the utility of outcome X. An outcome which 
yields the same utility as the expected utility of X is smaller than X, as denoted by the 
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blue “CE,” or certainty equivalent.  In summary, risk averse individuals are willing to 
take relatively smaller gains. Therefore, in a decision under risk, the risk averse 
individual is willing to sacrifice possible larger gains for the guarantee of a smaller gain. 
 The risk-seeking individual shows the opposite effect. The utility of outcome X is 
lower than the expected utility of X. An outcome which yields the same utility as the 
expected utility of X is larger than X, as denoted by the red “CE.” In summary, risk-
seeking individuals want only to have larger gains. In a decision under risk, the risk-
seeking individual will be willing to take on more risk in order to get larger gains.  
 Expected utility theory provides a model for decisions under uncertainty and 
explains differences in risk preferences, but expected utility theory has also come under 
criticism, particularly concerning the axiom of independence.  The independence axiom 
states that an individual’s preference ordering will not change if equal independent 
gambles are mixed with the original options one was considering. However, this axiom is 
systematically violated (Allais 1953). For example, consider a gamble where one has the 
option between winning $125 at .8 probability and winning $0 at .2 probability, or 
guarantee winning $100. In this situation, most people would choose the guaranteed $100 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). If we mix in a 50% chance to win 0$, the payoffs can be 
rewritten as $125 at probability .4 and $0 at probability .6, or $100 at probability .5 and 
$0 at probability .5.  In this case, most people would choose to gamble for $125 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The tendency to switch preferences when an equal 
gamble is mixed into one’s options is a direct violation of independence axiom of 
expected utility theory.   
The functional form of expected utility theory also implies that the negative utility 
of losses are equal to the positive utility of gains assuming the magnitude of loss or gain 
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is equal. In other words, final states of wealth are the primary carriers of utility.  There is 
also evidence that this is not true (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  For example, consider  
situation A in which you are first endowed with $1000, and then can choose to either take 
a gamble of even probabilities to win $200 or $0, or you can simply take a sure gain of 
$100. Now consider a situation B where you are first endowed with $1200 and can 
choose to either take a gamble of even probabilities to lose $200 or $0, or you can simply 
take a sure loss of $100. In both situations you are deciding to gamble for $1000 or $1200, 
or simply take $1100. But for the majority of people, taking the sure value of $100 is 
preferred in situation A, and the risky gamble of $200 or $0 is preferred in situation B. 
The consistently observed violations of axioms and implications of expected utility 
theory is what led to further investigation into more realistic decision-making models.   
C. Prospect theory 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (KT) were the first to make a convincing 
argument that expected utility theory was making unreasonable assumptions. Through a 
series of questionnaire-style experiments, KT consistently reproduced the behaviors 
which expected utility theory could not explain.  Their findings led to a new model of 
decision-making behavior which they called prospect theory (PT). The following 
paragraphs summarize the key aspects of PT which differentiate it from previous 
decision-making theories. 
According to PT, value or utility is generated by changes in wealth rather than 
final states of wealth (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  For example, consider two people, 
A and B. Person A is significantly richer than person B. If person A loses a small amount 
of money and person B gains a small amount of money, person A does not have more 
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utility than person B simply because they are still richer than person B. Rather, person A 
experienced disutility from the loss and person B experienced utility from the gain.  
Gains and losses of equal magnitude do not yield equal utility or disutility, 
respectively. PT reflects that losses loom heavier than gains (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). Therefore in a graphical representation of the PT value function there are two 
domains, the domain of gain and the domain of loss. The value function in the loss 
domain is characterized by a steep convex curve, and in the gain domain it is a shallower 
concave curve (see Figure 2).  
Next, PT states that people tend to over-value small probabilities, under-value 
large probabilities, and perceive moderate probabilities as relatively equal. For example, 
if a given option has a 1% chance to lose, people overestimate the likelihood of losing. If 
a given option has an 80% chance to lose, people might underestimate the likelihood of 
losing. If a given option has approximately the same probability of winning and losing, 
then people will evaluate the probabilities as equal.   
Finally, PT states that people place especially large utility on outcomes which are 
certain. This effect is also known as the certainty effect. The certainty effect explains why 
even when a gamble has a higher expected value than a sure increase of wealth, people 
will still tend to choose the sure increase of wealth. 
 PT is a superior model of decision-making behavior under risk compared to 
expected utility theory, because it explains two well documented behaviors that expected 
utility theory does not: changing risk preferences between gains and losses, and the 
violation of the independence axiom. 
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The distinction between losses and gains as put forth by PT implies that risk 
preferences change when in the domain of gain versus the domain of loss. According to 
PT, people are more risk-seeking in the domain of loss and more risk averse in the 
domain of gain. For example, consider an offer to gain $100 or flip a coin for $200 or $0. 
Most people would prefer to simply gain $100. But consider the offer again in terms of 
losses: lose $100, or flip a coin to lose $200 or $0. In this situation most people would 
prefer to gamble. One simple explanation for this is that a $100 loss is so bad, that the 
gamble option becomes relatively more attractive given the possibility of losing nothing. 
The difference in marginal utility between the domains of gain and loss explains why 
people’s risk preferences switch when questions are in terms of gains or losses.  
The certainty effect and non-linear weighting of probabilities explain why people 
regularly violate the independence axiom of expected utility theory. When given two 
options and one is certain, people will over-value certainty and choose that option. When 
the options both entail some level of risk, the probabilities associated with each option 
get weighted non-linearly, and people’s preferences may switch depending on how 
heavily they over-value small probabilities or under-value large probabilities.  
The behaviors that PT explains are largely captured by the PT value function.  Let 
Vi equal the overall utility of the decision an individual is making, xi equal potential 
outcomes in terms of wealth change, v(xi) equal value as a function of xi, pi equal the 
probabilities associated with the potential outcomes xi, and 𝜋  equal a probability 
weighting function.   
Vi=∑ 𝝅(𝒑𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ) ∗ 𝒗(𝒙𝒊) 
Because 𝑥𝑖  is defined as outcomes in terms of wealth change, it is changes in 
wealth which determine overall utility rather than final states. The 𝑣  function also causes 
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losses to yield more disutility than equal size gains yield utility. The 𝜋 function weights 
the probabilities associated with outcomes such that people overreact to small 
probabilities, underreact to large probabilities, and have increased value of sure outcomes. 
Therefore this model determines utility of a given prospect based on that prospect’s 
expected change in wealth, whether the change is negative or positive, the probability of 
that change, and the non-linear weighting of that probability.  
Observing the graphical form of the PT value function also helps to understand 
several key features of the theory. 
Figure 2: Prospect Theory Value Function 
 
In the graphical representation of the PT value function, change in wealth is 
measured on the X-axis and the utility of a given wealth change is measured on the Y-
axis. Everything to the right of the value function’s origin is the domain of gain, and 
everything to the left is the domain of loss.  
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The value function’s shape changes between the domain of gain and domain of 
loss. It is concave in the domain of gain and convex in the domain of loss. The value 
function in the domain of loss is also steeper than it is in the domain of gain. There are 
several things this shape implies. First, there is diminishing marginal utility for both 
losses and gains. Second, holding the magnitude of losses and gains equal, losses have a 
greater effect on utility than gains as is shown by the red lines in the figure.  Because 
losses have a large negative effect on utility, one will try to avoid certain loss. If one is 
guaranteed to take a loss, a risk may seem attractive as one over-values the possibility of 
success should one take the risk. Therefore, one is risk averse in the domain of gain and 
risk-seeking in the domain of loss.  
The origin of the PT value function is known as the reference point. The reference 
point is the level of wealth from which changes are coded as losses or gains. For example, 
consider two people, A and B. Person A’s current reference point is at $1200, and person 
B’s current reference point is at $1000. If person A goes from $1200 to $1100, then 
person A has entered the domain of loss and experienced disutility, or negative utility. If 
person B goes from $1000 to $1100, then person B has entered the domain of gain and 
experienced positive utility. Even though the final state of wealth is the same in both 
situations, utility was dependent on whether one was in the domain of gain or domain of 
loss, which was dependent on their reference point prior to the wealth change.   
For an investigation into how surprise affects behavior, reference points are a key 
aspect of decision-making models because a surprise is an unexpected change from one’s 
reference point. Therefore, the reference point suggested by PT will be investigated 
thoroughly. This includes highlighting the effects of reference point on utility, how 
reference points are formed, and how reference points might change.  
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Both risk preferences and utility are dependent on being in the domain of gain or 
loss according to PT. Whether one is in the domain of gain or domain of loss is 
dependent on one’s reference point, but determining an individual’s actual reference 
point can be complicated.  To put the idea of reference points into more relatable terms, 
KT use an example prompting the reader to consider a change in one’s upcoming 
paycheck.  Say you receive $10,000 every month. This month, you received $8,000 
instead.  If one’s reference point is the expectation to receive $10,000, then one might see 
an $8,000 paycheck as a loss of $2,000 from what was going to be their expected income.  
If one’s reference point is simply the wealth one had prior to getting the paycheck, then 
one might see the $8,000 paycheck as a gain of $8,000 from their current status quo of 
wealth.  Therefore, whether one’s reference point is based on expectations of future 
outcomes or the current status quo of wealth can affect if one perceives to be in the 
domain of gain or domain of loss, and subsequently affect that person’s risk preferences. 
Knowing how reference points are formed and how they might adjust is extremely 
important for creating a model which can accurately represent and predict behavior in 
decisions under risk. 
In several experiments KT (1979) assumed that the reference point was one’s 
status quo level of wealth. The questions used to estimate participants’ risk preferences 
generally involved asking something along the lines of, “do you prefer getting $1,000 or 
flipping a coin to get $2,000 or nothing?”  Questions like this have no prior outcomes 
from which one can form expectations, nor any subsequent rounds from which 
expectations could be made, so it must be that the status quo is the reference point. KT 
note that this may not be the case in every situation.  In some situations, one’s reference 
point may depend more on the expectations of an outcome. KT refer back to the example 
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of the reduced paycheck and argue that most people would see this situation as a loss 
from the expectation of the paycheck staying the same value as it was in the past.   They 
also provide an example whereby a businessman is in a slump market, but he takes a 
smaller loss than his competitors. In this case, the knowledge of the possibility of a larger 
loss makes his relatively smaller loss feel like a gain.   
Reference point adaptation also affects behavior through the evaluation of 
prospects. KT (1979) offer the following example: consider a businessman who has lost 
$2,000, but now faces a choice between gaining $1,000 for sure or flipping a coin to gain 
$2,000 or nothing.  If he has not adjusted to the prior loss, then he would see this choice 
not as gain $1,000 or flip a coin to gain $2,000. Rather, he would see it as a certain 
$1,000 loss or flip a coin to lose $2,000 or nothing.  Someone who has not adjusted to the 
loss prior to the decision will be more willing to accept risk since they are viewing the 
problem in the domain of loss, whereas someone who adjusts quickly will be less willing 
to accept risk as they are viewing the problem in the domain of gain.   
KT cite McGlothlin’s (1956) work about the efficiency of horse betting markets, 
saying that it is a lag of adjustment to losses which explains why people take more risky 
bets as the day goes on.   In particular, gamblers who have lost perceive themselves to be 
in the domain of loss, and therefore they are already more likely to accept risk and 
continue betting. It is possible that gamblers do not adapt to losses and thus continue to 
bet as they remain in the domain of loss. If gamblers were able to immediately adapt to 
losses, then the propensity for risk-seeking in gamblers may decrease.  Therefore, speed 
of reference point adaptation following outcomes is also an important factor in analyzing 
changes in behavior in decisions under risk.   
D. Expectations-based reference points 
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Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) provide a model which includes recent 
expectations about future outcomes as an important factor in reference point formation 
and adaptation.  In summary, expectations shift the reference point towards those 
expectations, such that the true domains of gain and loss are on either side of the 
expectations-based reference point, as shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Domains of Gain and Loss with Expectations-Based Reference Points 
 
 Refer to Figure 3. An expectation can shift the reference point toward that 
expectation, changing how prospects are evaluated. To motivate expectations-based 
reference points, Koszegi and Rabin (2007) use the example of a homeowner who is 
paying attention to the value of their house. A homeowner who foresees a loss in their 
house’s value will not be risk-loving, because their reference point has already updated to 
the foreseen loss.  Thus the homeowner may sell their house as they are not willing to 
take a risk to break even. In other words, the expectation of losses caused the reference 
point to shift such that the homeowner was more sensitive to further losses, and thus 
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became risk averse and sold the house. But a homeowner who was surprised by this loss 
will be risk-loving and feel compelled to stay in the market to break even, as the 
unexpected loss caused the home owner to stay in the domain of loss and be risky.  This 
is illustrated in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4: How Expectations Affect Utility 
 
Figure 4 compares the value functions of someone who does not expect to lose, 
and someone who expects to lose. Notice that the expectation causes the value function to 
shift to the right, as illustrated by a red value function. The person who was not expecting 
the loss moved along their value function into the domain of loss when the price she sold 
the house for was less than her reference point. Assuming the reference point fully 
updates with expectations, the curve shifts into the old domain of loss. Holding true that 
everything to the left of the value function is the domain of loss and everything to the 
right of the value function is the domain of gain, then as long as the home’s value does 
not exceed the maximum expectation of loss, the home’s value is in fact in the person’s 
domain of gain despite it having lost value.  
Expectations-based reference points have been shown to exist in the lab using a 
variety of different experiments.  Hack and Bieberstein (HB) (2014) used two 
experiments to test how expectations affect reference points.  The first is a modification 
of an experiment originally performed by Arkes, et al. (2008) to test for differences in 
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reference point adaptation in the domains of gain and loss.  Arkes et al.’s general form of 
the experiment was as follows: tell the subject that last month they bought a stock at $30. 
This month the stock’s price has either gone up or down $6.  The subject is then asked at 
what price the stock would need to trade next month in order to make the subject feel 
equally sad or happy with this month. Assuming the subject is able to accurately submit 
two different wealth values that give him/her equal utility, the following equation can be 
used to calculate reference point adaptation. Let 𝑃1 equal the previous stock price, 𝑅0 
equal the previous reference point, P* equal the new price given by the subject and R* 
equal the new reference point.   
P* - R* = 𝑷𝟏 - 𝑹𝟎  → ∆R = R* - 𝑹𝟎 = P* - 𝑷𝟏 
To see how this method works with numbers, consider buying a stock at $30, but 
it fell to $24 last month. 𝑃1 equals $24. The average price which generates equal disutility 
in the following month is $20, making P* equal $20. The calculation of reference point 
shift is as follows: 
20 – 24 = -4 
In the situation where going from $30 to $24 generates equal disutility as going 
from $24 to $20, the reference point must have shifted down by $4, making reference 
point shift equal -$4.  
This method is modified by HB (2014) to highlight the effect of expectations on 
reference point formation. They divide the subjects into two groups.  One group is simply 
told the stock price one month later. The other group is told that before the stock price 
initially changed, the price was predicted to be in a certain range.  No matter the 
predictions given to the subjects, the real price change of the stock was constant.  The 
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experiment showed that people who were given higher or lower expectations of the stock 
price would report higher or lower levels respectively at which the stock would need to 
trade in the following month.  Thus, the expectations of a price level had an effect on 
how people felt about the final nominal price of the stock.   
The second experiment in HB (2014) is a modification of an experiment first used 
by Holt and Laury (2002).  In Holt and Laury’s version of the experiment, participants 
were presented with a table which contained several rows. Within each row there were 
two options, a risky bet and a safe bet. Participants then indicate at each row whether they 
would prefer the risky or the safe bet at that row.  In order to show willingness-to-pay for 
risk, HB simplified the experiment such that the safe bet was simply a certain amount of 
points, and the risky bet was to flip a coin for a high amount of points.  In order to show 
the effect of expectations on the reference point, participants were subjected to a 
preliminary round in which they were endowed with some points.  In the control group, 
participants are simply endowed with 4 points. In the treatment groups, participants play 
a lottery.  In treatment group A, participants have a 50% chance to get 4 points and a 50% 
chance to get 8 points. In treatment group B, participants have a 75% chance to get 4 
points and a 25% chance to get 12 points.  HB were particularly interested in comparing 
those who won 4 points in the lottery to those who were endowed with 4 points. They 
found those who won the 4 point lottery in round 1 became more risky in round 2, 
suggesting they were in the domain of loss, and their reference points were being affected 
by the expectation of getting more points. 
E. Adapting prospect theory to account for how surprises affect behavior 
According to PT, the equation by which people evaluate options in a decision is: 
V=∑ 𝝅(𝒑𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ) ∗ 𝒗(𝒙𝒊) 
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This model does well for modeling the value of prospects assuming previous outcomes 
do not affect the evaluation of future prospects. But if previous outcomes do affect the 
evaluation of future prospects, then this model is not sufficient to capture all the things 
which influence the evaluation of a prospect and therefore how people make decisions.  
For example, consider playing a game where the goal is to maximize points, and you gain 
points by choosing option A or option B. Option A allows you to simply gain a point. 
Option B allows you to gain 2 points or 0 points with equal probability. Now consider 
two identical people in every respect.  One person chooses option B three times in a row 
and loses each time. The other person chooses option B three times and wins each time.  
When they evaluate the decision between A and B in the fourth round, their behaviors 
may be different (Thaler and Johnson 1990). 
 Given that prior outcomes affect decisions in future rounds, it must be that the 
utility from prior rounds is influencing prospect evaluations in future rounds. However, 
simply including prior utility into the evaluation of a future decision without considering 
the outcome in terms of its location relative to one’s reference point is an over-
simplification.  For example, if someone expected to lose $10, the effect of actually 
losing the $10 is greatly diminished, and the utility coded into the next decision is also 
diminished. If the $10 loss is a surprise, then the utility of loss is much larger, and the 
utility coded into the next decision is also larger. The effect of surprises on utility needs 
to be understood in order to appropriately edit prior outcomes into future prospects. 
 The definition of a surprise according to Rescorla and Wagner (1972) is the 
difference between what was expected and what actually happened. Based on Rescorla 
and Wagner’s definition, I constructed the following table which outlines all potential 
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outcomes and states whether the outcome was a surprise or not. A “+” indicates the 
surprise is positive, and a “-” indicates the surprise is negative.  
Table 1: Outcome Possibilities 
Expectation\Reality Big loss Small loss Maintain 
status quo 
Small gain Big gain 
Big loss Non-surprise Surprise + Surprise + Surprise + Surprise + 
Small loss Surprise - Non-surprise Surprise + Surprise + Surprise + 
Maintain status quo Surprise - Surprise - Non-surprise Surprise + Surprise + 
Small gain Surprise - Surprise - Surprise - Non-surprise Surprise + 
Big gain Surprise - Surprise - Surprise - Surprise - Non-surprise 
 
Table 1 provides a framework of outcomes categorized as surprising or not, 
negative or positive. The bold cells indicate the types of surprise I investigate in this 
study. In future investigations, all types of surprises according to this framework should 
be tested, but due to limited resources of time, incentives for play, and participants, I only 
test negative surprises when expecting to gain or maintain the status quo. 
Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), expectations shift the reference point 
in the direction of the expectation. The true domains of gain and loss are on either side of 
one’s expectations rather than relative to one’s current status quo. 1 If the domains of gain 
and loss exist around one’s expectations-based reference point, then surprise outcomes 
should have a significantly greater effect on utility both in the domains of gain and loss 
compared to expected outcomes.  Refer to Figure 5 to see more clearly how surprise 
increases utility or expectations diminish utility.  
  
                                                          
1 Assuming one’s expectation is not to maintain the status quo 
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Figure 5: Comparing Utilities of Surprise and Expected Outcomes 
 
Notice that in the image on the left, there is no reference point shift. Changes in 
wealth therefore yield utility, graphed on the Y axis. When there is a reference point shift 
based on the expectation to gain or lose, the utility of said gain or loss is diminished. 
Therefore, a positive outcome is enhanced if one was not expecting it, and a negative 
outcome is also enhanced if one was not expecting it.  The greater magnitude of utility 
changes following surprise outcomes should be apparent based on how an individual’s 
risk preferences change after unexpected events compared expected events.  In other 
words, a surprise loss should result in greater movement into the domain of loss, and 
therefore result in more risk-seeking compared to an expected loss. A surprise gain 
should result in a greater movement into the domain of gain and result in greater risk 
aversion compared to an expected gain.  
To account for the effect that surprise has on future decisions, I add another 
feature to standard PT.  Let Vt represent the value of a given prospect in round t of a 
multi-round round game, xi represent the given prospect in round t, pi represent the 
probability of xi, xt-1 represent the outcome of round t-1 in the game, ψt-1 represent the 
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location of the expectations-based reference point along the x-axis of the value function, 
and ut-1 represent the value function for the outcome of round t-1.  
Vt=∑ 𝝅(𝒑𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ) ∗ 𝒗[𝒙𝒊 + 𝒖𝒕−𝟏(𝒙𝒕−𝟏 − ψ𝒕−𝟏 )] 
 According to this value function, when an outcome exactly meets one’s 
expectations, then the evaluation of one’s next prospect is simply prospect theory because 
xt-1 equals ψt-1.  With a positive or negative surprise, the value of a prospect can increase 
or decrease respectively. Therefore even when considering a prospect in the domain of 
loss, a prior surprise gain can positively influence the expected value of future prospects. 
F. Testing for the effects of surprise on behavior 
 There are several ways to test the effect surprise has on behavior. Based on PT 
with expectations-based reference points, surprise magnifies the utility of outcomes. 
Therefore, the effect of surprise on utility should be tested.  
 If surprise affects utility, then risk preferences will also be affected by surprise. 
For example, if a surprise loss is coded further into the domain of loss than the same loss 
had it been expected, then risk-seeking should be larger for surprise losses compared to 
expected losses. If a surprise gain is coded further into the domain of gain than the same 
gain had it been expected, then risk aversion should be larger for surprise gains compared 
to expected gains.   The effect of surprise on risk preferences should be tested.  
 Finally, speed of ex-post reference point shift is another important consideration 
for how surprise affects behavior. There is relatively limited research on ex-post 
reference point shifts. Arkes et al. (2008) find that reference point shift is faster in the 
domain of gain than the domain of loss. The primary distinction between the domain of 
gain and the domain of loss is that marginal utility is smaller at all points in the domain of 
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gain compared to the domain of loss. If reference point shift and marginal utility are 
inversely related, then ex-post reference point shift for surprise outcomes should be larger 
than ex-post reference point shift for expected outcomes due to diminishing marginal 
utility. The effect of surprise on reference point adaptation should be tested.  
 The following is a summary of my hypotheses concerning the effect that surprise 
has on behavior based on PT and findings related to PT.  
1. An unexpected loss should yield greater disutility than an expected loss. 
2. An unexpected gain should yield greater utility than an expected gain. 
3. Surprise gains should cause greater risk aversion than expected gains in 
subsequent time periods. 
4. Surprise losses should cause greater risk-seeking than expected losses in 
subsequent time periods. 
5. Ex-post reference point shift for surprise outcomes should be greater than ex-post 
reference point shift for expected outcomes in the domain of loss. 
6. Ex-post reference point shift for surprise outcomes should be greater than ex-post 
reference point shift for expected outcomes in the domain of gain.  
 To fully test how surprises affect behavior, all six of these hypotheses should be 
tested. Because of limited resources in terms of research participants, adequate incentives 
for real play, and time to conduct research, I only test hypotheses 1, 4, and 5, the negative 
surprise hypotheses. In future investigations of this topic, the positive surprise hypotheses 
should also be tested. 
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III. Methods 
 The experiments I use to observe the effect of surprise on behavior are based on 
those used by HB (2014). HB use two distinct experiments to research reference point 
shifts. The first experiment is in the style of a questionnaire based on Arkes et al.’s (2008) 
experiments. The second experiment is in the style of a game based on Holt and Laury’s 
(2002) experiments.  I first outline the source of my participants, materials used, and the 
general procedures of the experiment. Then I detail each experiment separately: the 
design of the experiment, the results, and discussion of results.  
A. Participants 
Participants in my experiment were all autumn 2015 to spring 2016 Lake Forest 
College students. All participants were students in classes where professors allowed me 
class time to conduct the experiment. These classes included Introduction to Economics, 
Intermediate Microeconomics, Intermediate Macroeconomics, and Cross-cultural 
Psychology classes. There were 100 females and 113 males, yielding 213 total 
observations.  The average age of participants was 19.6 years old. Participation was 
voluntary, and no student decided to opt out of the experiment. The samples are not 
random because individuals selected into those particular courses. If the characteristics 
that affect selection of courses also affects the examined behaviors in my study, then the 
results will not be representative of the general population.  
B. Materials and incentive system 
 All responses were recorded in packets of paper which included a consent form, 
instructions and questions, and a debriefing form at the end which participants were not 
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allowed to look at until their final responses were recorded and handed in. See Figures A 
and B in the appendix to see the full versions of each experimental packet.  
 Because this experiment was conducted by a human rather than a computer, I 
tried to minimize irregularities in how instructions were given. The experimenter used a 
pre-written script each time the experiment was conducted. To see the script, refer to 
Figure E in the appendix.  
 The second experiment was a game which included two elements of randomness, 
a random number between 1 and 17 and a coin flip. Two smart phone applications were 
used to generate random numbers and coin flips. Those applications are Random Number 
by Saranomy version gpv1.0.11 and Coin Flip, copyright 2015 by Richard Banasiak with 
contributions from Alex Baker, Ciaran Gultnieks, Spanti Nicola and Michael Riepen, 
version 6.4. 
 A chance to win a $50 gift card to Walgreens was used to encourage genuine play 
in the game stage of the experiment. The chance to win was determined in a raffle, 
whereby one’s point total at the end of the game would equal the amount of raffle tickets 
a participant would receive. If the participant had a negative score at the end of the 
experiment, they would still receive one ticket. The raffle tickets used were blue with two 
rows of tickets running parallel whose numbers were identical. This way, both the 
participant and experimenter would have a copy of the ticket number rather than a name 
associated with a ticket. This was done to preserve anonymity and elicit truthful behavior.  
C. General procedures 
 The experiment was always conducted during class time under the supervision 
and assistance of the professor leading the class. The class times during which the 
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experiment took place ranged from 9 AM to 3:30 PM. The experimenter entered the 
classroom and with the help of the professor distributed experimental packets to all 
students in the classroom. Students were instructed not to look inside the packet. The 
front page was the participant consent form. Once all students in the class had a packet, 
the experimenter read the consent form aloud to the students. Students who agreed with 
the consent form signed it, removed it from the packet and submitted it to the 
experimenter.  
 The next page in the packet included instructions which gave an overview of what 
was going to occur during the experiment. After consent forms were handed in, the 
experimenter read the instructions aloud while participants followed along. Then after 
instructions were read, all participants flipped to the first page of experiment 1 together.  
The experimenter read the script of experiment 1, read the first question, and gave 
time for the participants to answer. Once all participants had answered, the experimenter 
read the second question and gave the participants some time to answer. After all 
participants had answered the second question, the page was flipped. 
 The next page in the packet was the questionnaire of demographic information. 
The questionnaire asked participants to record age, sex, race/ethnicity one most closely 
identifies with, major(s) or field(s) of study, and whether one would go skydiving if given 
the opportunity. The purpose of the skydiving question is to obtain the most general form 
of baseline risk preferences that a person has under the assumption that someone who 
would like to skydive is also generally more risk-seeking.  
The final pages of the packet were Experiment 2, the game. The experimenter 
read the initial explanation of the game and instructions of how to play to the participants. 
Participants then filled in a practice version of the game which had no impact on one’s 
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actual score in the real version of the game. Participants were also allowed to ask 
questions about how the game works, to which the experimenter responded with an ad-
libbed answer. Once all participants were allowed to ask questions, the game began. For 
group A, the experimenter told all participants before the game started that after the 
conclusion of round one, everyone will have to take 12 points away from their scores, 
even if it made their scores negative. For group B, the game began with no warning of the 
points being taken away. The experimenter allowed the participants a duration of time to 
fill in the game table however they wished.  
 Once all participants had filled in their game tables, the experimenter used the 
random number generator to assign a random number between 1 and 17 to each 
participant. This number would correspond to a row in the game table which the 
participant just filled out. At whatever row a participant was assigned, he/she indicated a 
preference to gamble or not at that row. After each participant’s row was assigned, the 
experimenter asked all participants who gambled at their assigned rows to raise their 
hands. The experimenter then used the coin flip application to tell participants 
individually if they won or lost their gamble. The coin was flipped once for each person 
who took the gamble. Heads indicated a win, tails indicated a loss. Participants then 
wrote down the points earned after that round. Next, the experimenter told everyone in 
both groups A and B to take 12 points away from their scores. For group A, this 
announcement was expected, and for group B this announcement was a surprise.  
After everyone had subtracted 12 points from their scores, round two of the game 
began. The experimenter told the participants that the table was exactly the same as 
before, and that they may fill it in however they like keeping in mind that they are trying 
to maximize points.  The experimenter also told participants that no more points will be 
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taken away for the remainder of the game. Once everyone’s tables had been filled in, the 
experimenter assigned new random rows to each participant, gamblers were again asked 
to raise their hands, winners and losers were determined, and final scores were recorded. 
Raffle tickets were distributed as participants were handing in their answer sheets.  
IV. Experiment 1 
A. Design 
Experiment 1 is based on Arkes et al.’s (2008) method for calculating reference 
point shift. I modify this experiment to measure the effect surprise has on reference point 
shift as well as utility. 
Arkes et al.’s (2008) original method allows for calculation of ex-post reference 
point shift in the context of stock prices. The calculation is as follows: if 𝑃1 equals the 
previous stock price, 𝑅0 equals the previous reference point, P* equals the new price 
given by the subject, and R* equals the new reference point, then: 
P* - R* = 𝑷𝟏 - 𝑹𝟎  → ∆R = R* - 𝑹𝟎 = P* - 𝑷𝟏 
In words this equation states that if utility is equal between two changes in wealth, 
then the difference between the reference point and the final state of wealth must also be 
equal.  This can then be rearranged to state that the difference in reference points is equal 
to the new state of wealth following the first wealth change and the new state of wealth 
following the second wealth change. In both Arkes et al.’s (2008) and HB’s (2014) 
version of this experiment, changes in the value of stock prices were used to elicit 
responses. The questions used by Arkes et al. are as follows:  
Say you bought a stock at the price $30. This month the price fell to $24. At what 
price would the stock have to trade to make you equally unhappy with last month?  
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In this case, one would fill in the reference point adaptation equation as follows: 
P* - R* = 𝟐𝟒 - 30  → ∆R = R* - 30= P* - 24 
If the participant’s response was, for example, $20, then the equation would be 
filled in: 
P* - R* = 𝟐𝟒 - 30  → ∆R = R* - 30= 20 – 24 
∆R= -$4 
To see the effect surprise has on reference point adaptation, I used two different 
prompts to elicit responses. These prompts are the following: 
Group A: You are the owner of a small business. All year every year your 
monthly profits are $100,000. This value fluctuates from time to time, but luckily 
your company has an incredibly skilled adviser. She is always able to predict 
when and how the company's profits will change.  Last month your profits fell by 
$20,000. Your adviser did not predict this, so the change was totally unexpected. 
Group B: You are the owner of a small business. All year every year your 
monthly profits are $100,000. This value fluctuates from time to time, but luckily 
your company has an incredibly skilled adviser. She is always able to predict 
when and how the company's profits will change.  Last month your profits fell by 
$20,000. Your adviser did predict this, so the change was totally expected. 
The two prompts are exactly the same, except the prompt for group A describes 
the change of profit as totally unexpected, and the prompt for group B describes the 
change as totally expected.   
The context of the prompt has also changed in my version. Rather than look at 
changing stock prices, changes in profit were used. I made this decision for several 
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reasons.  First, one group needed to feel as though a change of value could be genuinely 
expected. Based on the efficient market hypothesis, the stock market is unpredictable, 
and I did not want this fact influencing whether participants took the question seriously. I 
left the details of why profits fell ambiguous because this allows for participants to more 
easily accept whether the profit change was expected. For example, the expected profit 
loss could be due to seasonal changes, but the unexpected profit loss could be due to 
some exogenous shock. 
  After the participants in each group read their respective prompts, they were then 
asked the following question:  
“On a scale of 1 to 10, how unhappy does this make you? 
1 is little to no unhappiness, 10 is extreme unhappiness.” 
 There are two purposes of this question. The primary purpose is to get an 
estimation of the average disutility experienced between groups A and B. The secondary 
purpose is to give participants a reference point around which to determine values of 
profit loss that would yield equal disutility.  Arkes et al. (2008) note that there is some 
concern about whether participants can accurately determine values of money in future 
time periods that yield equal levels of utility.  By attributing a reference point around 
which to determine hypothetical disutility, participants may be more accurate in their 
responses of a value which would yield equal disutility in the future. 
The next question given to the participants was: 
“In the situation above your profits fell last month. How much money 
would you have to lose again this month to feel equally unhappy? Note that this is 
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not necessarily the same value of money lost last month, it is the value of money 
lost this month that would make you feel equally unhappy with last month.” 
This question prompts the participant to record a loss of profit which yields equal 
disutility, or what I call an equal-utility-loss-value (EULV). 
In Arkes et al.’s (2008) version of the experiment, participants are asked to record 
what final state of wealth would yield equal disutility. This value is then used to calculate 
reference point shift. My method eliminates the calculation step by simply asking what 
loss would yield equal disutility. To see the distinction more clearly, first consider Arkes 
et al.’s version of the experiment where reference point shift was calculated as follows: 
assume the original loss resulted in a final state of wealth of $24, and the average 
response as to what final state would yield equal disutility was $20, then the reference 
point shift would be calculated as: 
$20 - $24= -$4 
 This equation can be rewritten in terms of total value lost from the original price 
of $30: 
Total amount lost – Initial amount lost = Reference point shift 
(30-10) – (30-6) = -4 
-10 – (-6) = -4 
 Given that the largest possible profits one could earn in the two month period in 
the prompt are $200,000, then the reference point shift calculation according to Arkes et 
al.’s (2008) method looks like this. Let X represent the EULV reported by subjects 
following the $20,000 loss.  
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[200,000-(X+20,000)] – [200,000 – 20,000] 
Using distribution: 
-(X+20,000)+20,000 
-X 
 Thus, the EULV reported is the amount by which the reference point has shifted 
for each group on average according to Arkes et al.’s (2008) methods.2   
 There are a couple advantages to having respondents report an EULV rather than 
a final state. First, having responses in terms of losses rather than final states makes 
interpretation of the results easier. Whatever the respondents report as the value of loss 
that makes them equally unhappy is simply their reference point shift.   
The second advantage to asking the question in terms of losses is that an EULV 
provides information on people’s marginal reactiveness to loss. That is, if group A 
reports a larger EULV than group B, then group A is relatively less reactive to further 
losses than group B. If group A reports a smaller EULV than group B, then group A 
relatively more reactive to further loss than group B.  
 There are two necessary assumptions for proper interpretation of the data in this 
experiment. These assumptions are outlined below. 
1. The average perception of the unhappiness scale was the same between the 
groups. 
                                                          
2 It is possible that framing the question in terms of losses rather than final states of wealth will change how 
people respond. Kahneman and Tversky point out that it is changes in wealth which are the carriers of 
utility, not final states, so it is possible that focusing on final states rather than changes may underestimate 
reference point shift, as less disutility may be associated with a final state rather than a change. For now I 
will assume that the effect is negligible, and will allow further research to investigate this topic.  
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It is likely that each individual person had their own perception of what 
feeling justified what number on the unhappiness scale. We will assume that the 
average perception of the scale is the same between the groups.  If there are 
differences in how the unhappiness scale is perceived between group A and group 
B, then it is impossible to tell if there are any differences in the real disutility 
experienced.  
2. The average EULVs accurately reflect the values of loss that would yield equal 
disutility in the following time period.  
 Due to discounting of values over time, there may be a slight 
overestimation of EULVs, but the effect of time discounting should not affect a 
comparison of average EULVs between the groups assuming both groups face the 
same average levels of time discounting. 
B. Predictions 
Prediction 1: Group A, the surprised group, will report higher average unhappiness than 
group B, the group which expected the loss.   
Prediction 2: Group A, the surprised group, will report a higher EULV (reference point 
shift) than group B, the group which expected the loss.  
This prediction may seem counter-intuitive at first. Consider two people, 1 and 2. 
Both face a loss of –X. Person 1 is very unhappy with the loss, while person 2 is only 
slightly unhappy with the loss. Because person 1 is very unhappy, her marginal disutility 
of loss is very high, so her tolerance of further loss must be very low. Because person 2 is 
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only slightly unhappy, his marginal disutility of loss is low relative to person 1’s, so his 
tolerance of further loss must be greater than person 1’s. 
In the case of comparing individuals, we can assume that their reference point 
locations are the same prior to the loss. This way the difference in reaction to the loss 
between persons 1 and 2 is dependent on each individual’s marginal reactiveness to 
wealth changes. This can be seen in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Differences in Individual Reactions to an Outcome 
 
As you can see, person 1 is more reactive to wealth changes than person 2. 
Therefore person 1 is made more unhappy by –X, and she is less tolerant of taking on 
more losses. 
Now consider comparing two groups of randomly selected people, group A and 
group B. Group B knows that –X is going to happen in the next time period. For group A, 
-X is a surprise. If surprise increases utility magnitudes, it would be intuitive to think that 
the surprised group should report a relatively low EULV, as their marginal disutility of 
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loss appears to be greater, and so their tolerance of further loss should be smaller.  
However, this is not the case. 
Group A should report higher unhappiness than group B because –X is surprising 
to group A. When comparing groups, the average value functions of each group should 
be the same assuming the groups are comprised of randomly selected people.  This way, 
the difference in average reaction to loss between groups is based on the difference in the 
locations of the average reference points rather than the difference in marginal reactivity 
seen in individuals. Differences in group reactions can be seen in Figure 7.  
Figure 7: Differences in Group Reactions to an Outcome 
 As you can see, group A, the surprised group, is made more unhappy by –X than 
group B, the group that had expectations of –X. Despite group A having a greater level of 
disutility from -X, group A’s marginal reactivity to loss at –X is smaller than group B’s 
marginal reactivity to loss. Therefore, group A should report a higher EULV than group 
B.   
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C. Results 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Experiment 1 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables     
Unhappiness 5.556 2.226 1 10 
Nominal EULV 14871.490 10747.960 1 50000 
Logged EULV 8.799 2.488 0 10.820 
Independent variables     
Group A 0.474 0.500 0 1 
Female  0.469 0.500 0 1 
[Females] X [Group A] 0.235 0.425 0 1 
Nonwhite 0.362 0.482 0 1 
[Nonwhites] X [Group A] 0.155 0.363 0 1 
Unhappiness (for 
regressions of EULV) 
5.552 2.237 0 10 
Refer to Table 2. In the regression analysis, I use nominal unhappiness as opposed 
to logged unhappiness or another monotonic transformation of the data, as the 
distribution of unhappiness is relatively normal. 3  Nominal EULV is simply what 
participants recorded as their EULVs. Logged EULV is the natural log of EULV. Both 
nominal and logged EULVs are included because there is a slight skew in both 
distributions. 
Group A is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the participant was in group A 
and 0 if in group B. Female is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the participant was a 
female and 0 otherwise. Nonwhite is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the participant 
was not white and 0 otherwise. The female and nonwhite variables are then interacted 
with group, such that they equal 1 if they are both female and in group A or nonwhite and 
                                                          
3 Refer to Figure F in the appendix to see the distribution of unhappiness. Also it should be noted that 
although participants were prompted to record a value from 1 to 10, one participant reported unhappiness of 
0. This participant was in group B, the group where the loss was expected, so it is possible their 
expectations fully adapted to the loss. Nonetheless, I recode this value as a 1. 
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in group A, and 0 otherwise. This is to see if the effects of surprise affect certain 
demographic variables differently.  
Table 3: Regressions of Unhappiness Reported in Experiment 1 
     
Variable Unhappiness Unhappiness 
    
Group A 0.849*** 0.980** 
  (0.303) (0.464) 
Female 0.204 0.143 
  (0.303) (0.419) 
Group A Female - 0.148 
  - (0.609) 
Non-white 0.089 0.342 
  (0.315) (0.427) 
Group A Non-white - -0.564 
  - (0.635) 
R2 0.039 0.043 
n 213 213 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate significance to the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Prediction 1: Refer to Table 3. Prediction 1 states that group A should report higher 
unhappiness than group B. According to the regressions, being in group A caused 
unhappiness to increase by almost a full point on the 1-10 unhappiness scale with 
significance at the 1% level in the first model and significance at the 5% level in the 
second model. No other variables were significant predictors of unhappiness. Given this 
result, prediction 1 is confirmed, and therefore there is strong evidence that surprise 
magnifies the utility of outcomes.  
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Table 4: Regressions of Nominal and Logged EULVs  
       
Variable EULV EULV Logged 
EULV 
Logged 
EULV 
      
Group A 2633.827* 2299.200 0.194 0.312 
  (1497.384) (2278.878) (0.352) (0.535) 
Female 1368.851 1792.547 -0.079 0.235 
  (1473.048) (2038.472) (0.346) (0.478) 
Group A Female - -970.533 - -0.680 
  - (2958.939) - (0.695) 
Non-white 1640.663 661.639 -0.011 -0.255 
  (1530.614) (2077.565) (0.360) (0.488) 
Group A non-white - 2192.183 - 0.561 
  - (3092.935) - (0.726) 
Unhappiness -588.405* -572.589* -0.014 -0.001 
  (335.962) (337.784) (0.079) (0.079) 
R2 0.033 0.036 0.002 0.009 
n 213 213 213 213 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate significance to the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Prediction 2: Refer to Table 4. Prediction 2 states that group A should report higher 
EULV than group B. Only in the first model is the group dummy variable a statistically 
significant predictor of EULV. Moreover, group is only significant at the 10% level in 
this regression, so the result is not very robust. In all four regressions, the sign on group 
A is positive, indicating there is some evidence in support of prediction 2, that group A 
would report a higher EULV than group B. The coefficient on unhappiness is also 
negative in all four models and significant at the 10% level in the models of nominal 
EULV, indicating that for people in both groups, as marginal reactivity to loss increased, 
tolerance of loss decreased. Given these results, there is some evidence to support 
prediction 2. The effect of surprise on reference point shift should be investigated more in 
future research.  
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D. Discussion of results for experiment 1 
Prediction 1 states that group A should report higher average unhappiness than 
group B because group A was told the loss of $20,000 was not expected. According to 
the results, group A did report higher average unhappiness than group B, and therefore 
there is strong evidence that surprise increases the disutility of loss. It is important to 
keep in mind that the unhappiness is scale has the potential for subjective interpretations. 
For example, the two groups may in fact experience almost identical feelings of disutility 
on average, but given the context from which they judge the scale, one group may report 
a 5 on average and the other group may report a 6 on average. One potential change to 
the methods in future experiments would be to use an explicitly ordinal prompt. For 
example, a question could be designed as the following.  
Consider the following scenarios: 
1. You were told by your boss last month you would get a $500 dollar raise this 
month. As expected, you get the raise this month. 
2. This month your boss surprised you with a $500 dollar raise. 
In which scenario does getting the $500 feel better to you? 
 By using explicitly ordinal prompts, you may be able to ascertain with more 
confidence whether surprise outcomes do yield more utility than expected outcomes.  
Prediction 2 states that the ex-post reference point shift (EULV) for group A 
would be greater than the reference point shift for group B. Only in one regression at the 
10% significance level was group a significant predictor of EULV.  In all 4 regressions 
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with EULV as the dependent variable, the coefficient on the group A variable was 
positive. This result indicates some support for prediction 2.  
 Another important result is that in one regression at the 10% significance level, 
higher unhappiness is correlated with lower EULV. This result confirms the intuition that 
when comparing reactions overall, higher unhappiness indicates more marginal reactivity 
to loss, and therefore lower EULV or reference point shift.   
The results of EULV and unhappiness also support the hypothesis that reference 
point shift and marginal reactivity are inversely related. There are now three scenarios in 
which this has been shown to be true.  
First, Arkes et al.’s (2008) results showed that reference point shift is faster in the 
domain of gain. Marginal reactivity is lower in the domain of gain compared to the 
domain of loss.  
Second, when comparing individuals who have equal reference points, someone 
who is more marginally reactive to loss will be less tolerant of further loss. Someone who 
is less marginally reactive will be more tolerant of further loss. This less reactive person 
will report a larger EULV, and thus a larger reference point shift.  
Finally, when comparing groups with different reference points, the surprised 
group will be further into the domain of loss than the group which expected the loss. Due 
to diminishing marginal utility, the surprised group will be less reactive to further loss. 
The surprised group will report a higher EULV, and thus a larger reference point shift.  
 The apparent relationship between marginal utility of an outcome and reference 
point shift may be worth investigating more. Let us label the speed with which one’s 
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reference point changes as “adaptability”; how quickly you can adjust to changes. Second, 
let us label marginal utility as “reactiveness”: how much you react to changes in wealth.  
If adaptability and reactiveness are inversely related, then people who are more reactive 
are less adaptable, and people who are not very reactive are more adaptable. If people’s 
adaptability and reactiveness are also variable, times when you are very reactive will 
prevent you from adapting, and times when you are not reactive will help you adapt.  
This could be why in emergency situations people are told to stay calm; staying calm 
makes adjusting to the situation easier, thereby reducing risk-seeking.  
 Given the results of experiment 1, further research into how surprise affects utility 
and reference point shift is warranted.  
V. Experiment 2 
A. Design 
 The design of this experiment is based on HB’s (2012) experiments into the effect 
of expectations on reference point formation, which is based on Holt and Laury’s (2002) 
experiments. The game is designed to observe people’s risk preferences in terms of 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the risky prospect, which in this case is to gamble for 
points rather than take a sure value of points. The following table was used to gather 
participants’ WTP for a gamble in the game. 
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Table 5: Game Table 
Row 
Number 
Gamble Receive 
Sure 
Value 
Choice 
(S or G) 
1 50/50 chance to win 20 points 0 points  
2 50/50 chance to win 20 points 1 points  
3 50/50 chance to win 20 points 2 points  
4 50/50 chance to win 20 points 3 points  
5 50/50 chance to win 20 points 4 points  
6 50/50 chance to win 20 points 5 points  
7 50/50 chance to win 20 points 6 points  
8 50/50 chance to win 20 points 7 points  
9 50/50 chance to win 20 points 8 points  
10 50/50 chance to win 20 points 9 points  
11 50/50 chance to win 20 points 10 points  
12 50/50 chance to win 20 points 11 points  
13 50/50 chance to win 20 points 12 points  
14 50/50 chance to win 20 points 13 points  
15 50/50 chance to win 20 points 14 points  
16 50/50 chance to win 20 points 15 points  
17 50/50 chance to win 20 points 16 points  
 Table 5 is the game table presented to participants in experiment 2. In each round 
of the game participants were told to write S or G in each row to indicate if they would 
prefer the sure value of points or the gamble, respectively. The rational strategy was to 
gamble starting at 0 points, then gamble for consecutive rows until one would prefer the 
sure value of points, then take sure value for the following consecutive rows. The WTP 
for the risky prospect therefore was the highest level of points at which one would prefer 
to gamble assuming all levels of points below that were also gambled upon.  
Group A was told that after the conclusion of round 1 that 12 points would be 
taken away from their round 1 scores.4 If group A includes this new information in their 
                                                          
4 Note that now group B is the surprised group and group A is expecting a loss.  In experiment 1, group A 
was the surprised group and group B expected a loss. The role of being the surprised group was switched 
between experiments 1 and 2 in order to prevent the surprised group in experiment 1 from anticipating a 
surprise in experiment 2.   
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evaluations of the potential payoffs, then the game table should resemble to them the 
following: 
Table 6: Game Table as Perceived by Group A 
Row 
Number 
Gamble Receive 
Sure 
Value 
Choice 
(S or G) 
1 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -12 points  
2 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -11 points  
3 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -10 points  
4 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -9 points  
5 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -8 points  
6 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -7 points  
7 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -6 points  
8 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -5 points  
9 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -4 points  
10 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -3 points  
11 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -2 points  
12 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points -1 points  
13 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points 0 points  
14 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points 1 point  
15 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points 2 points  
16 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points 3 points  
17 50/50 chance to win 8/-12 points 4 points  
Table 6 shows how the game table should be perceived by participants in group A, 
the group told about the 12 point loss ahead of time. Assuming group A’s reference point 
does not fully adapt to being inside the domain of loss, then the information of losing 12 
points will cause the expected utility of round 1 to be coded in the domain of loss for 
group A.  This will cause group A to have higher WTP for the risky prospect in round 1 
compared to group B who will code all outcomes in the domain of gain.  
In evaluating behaviors in the second round there are two layers of surprise that 
need to be considered. The first layer is the surprise 12 point loss for group B. This layer 
of the surprise is what we are most interested in.  The experiment is designed to see if 
there is a difference in how the two groups react to an equal loss of points, the only 
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difference being whether or not a group expected the loss. Group B was not informed of 
the 12 point loss, so the average group B reference point is somewhere in the positive 
region of the points axis. Group A was informed of the loss, so their reference point will 
be lower on the points axis compared to group B. This means there is a range of points 
between the average reference points of the two groups where group A and group B 
could have the same exact outcome, but group A will be positively surprised and group B 
will be negatively surprised. I refer to this region as the opposite-surprise-region, or OSR. 
The OSR is highlighted in orange in the Figure 8. Recall, RP stands for reference point. 
Figure 8: Opposite-Surprise Range of Groups A and B 
 
Refer to Figure 8. Within the OSR, outcome X is in the domain of gain for person 
A, but X is in the domain of loss for person B. For the purpose of analyzing experiment 2, 
a precise definition of the OSR is not necessary. Because the 12 point loss happens 
following the initial distribution of points, any value of points following the conclusion of 
round 1 will be a negative surprise for group B. The effect of surprise on WTP for the 
risky prospect can be captured simply by the dummy variable for being in group A 
because any value for group B will be a negative surprise relative to group A’s perception 
of outcomes. Even a negative surprise for group A will be an even more negative surprise 
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for group B, and positive surprises for group A will still be negative surprises for group B. 
In summary, the first layer of surprise caused by the loss of points can be captured simply 
by the group A dummy variable.  
The other layer of surprise which may affect behavior is the surprise each 
individual experiences relative to their own expectations. This layer of surprise is simply 
a byproduct of how the experiment is designed. When participants choose their individual 
utility-maximizing WTP for the risky prospect, they develop a belief about what amount 
of points they reasonably expect to have at the conclusion of the round. Then outcomes 
are evaluated relative to the expected level of points, causing an outcome to be 
considered a positive surprise, negative surprise, or expected outcome.  
We can observe the effect of uncertainty resolution regarding round 1 outcomes 
on behavior by including variables which account for round 1 performance in the 
regressions of round 2 WTP. For example, the effects of winning or losing the gamble 
can be observed. Nominal score, negative or positive scores, and winning or losing the 
gamble following round 1 should all be observed to see the effects of uncertainty 
resolution on round 2 risk preferences.  
B. Predictions 
 Because we are primarily concerned with the effect that the surprise loss has on 
behavior, predictions and data concerning the 12 point loss will be separate from 
predictions and data concerning general uncertainty resolution. The following are 
predictions concerning the effect of the 12 point loss, the primary layer of surprise we are 
concerned about.  
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Prediction 1: In round 1 of the game, group A should report a higher average WTP for 
risk than group B due to the information of a coming loss causing most outcomes to be 
coded into the domain of loss.  This is assuming group A’s reference point does not fully 
adapt following the information of imminently losing 12 points. 
Prediction 2: Group B should report a higher average WTP for the risky prospect than 
group A in round 2. After the 12 point loss has happened, both groups will have full 
information to the game. The total disutility of information and loss experienced by group 
A is less than group B’s disutility of the surprise loss. This idea is captured by the 
following expression. Let UA stand for disutility experienced by group A and UB stand for 
disutility experienced by group B. 
[UA Information of Loss + UA Experience of Loss] < [UB Experience of Loss] 
 If this expression is true, then group B should be further into the domain of loss 
than group A at the conclusion of round 1, so group B should be more risky than group A 
in round 2. 
Prediction 3: The WTP difference, or [round 2 WTP]-[round 1 WTP] should be greater 
for group B than group A. In other words, group B should become risky in round 2 faster 
than group A becomes risky in round 2 following the loss of points.   
The following are predictions concerning general uncertainty resolution following 
the conclusion of round 1. 
Prediction 4: For both groups, higher points in round 1 should cause lower WTP in round 
2.  It is possible that group B, the surprised group, will increase risk-seeking as round 1 
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score decreases faster than group A.  This is because group B’s scores will be further in 
the domain of loss than group A’s scores.  
Prediction 5: If 0 is a reference point around which participants determine whether they 
have won or lost, then a negative score in round 1 should lead to higher risk in round two.  
Also group B should increase WTP for the gamble in round 2 faster than group A, 
because negative scores will be further in the domain of loss for group B than group A.  
Prediction 6: If a member of either group lost the gamble, they should seek more risk in 
round 2 because losing the gamble is undeniably in the domain of loss for both groups 
assuming participants in group A do not completely expect to lose the gamble.  
Prediction 7: If a member of either group won the gamble, they should have lower WTP 
for the gamble in round 2 compared to WTP for risk in round 1.  It is possible that group 
A will decrease riskiness faster than group B if they win the gamble because winning the 
gamble will be further into the domain of gain for a group A participant compared to a 
group B participant. 
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C. Results  
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Experiment 2 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
Round 1 WTP 9.674 2.873 1 16 
Round 2 WTP 10.230 3.368 1 16 
Round 2 WTP, excluding Round 1 
gamblers 
9.850 3.282 1 16 
WTP Difference 0.551 2.716 -8 9 
Independent demographic 
variables 
    
Group A 0.473 0.501 0 1 
Female 0.478 0.501 0 1 
[Group A] X [Female] 0.237 0.426 0 1 
Nonwhite 0.367 0.483 0 1 
[Group A] X [Nonwhite] 0.155 0.362 0 1 
Skydiver 0.778 0.417 0 1 
[Group A] X [Skydiver] 0.343 0.476 0 1 
Independent round 1 outcome 
variables  
    
Round 1 Score -1.620 8.058 -12 15 
[Group A] X [Round 1 Score]  -0.729 5.680 -12 8 
Lost gamble 0.300 0.459 0 1 
[Group A] X [Lost gamble] 0.150 0.358 0 1 
Won gamble 0.261 0.440 0 1 
[Group A] X [Won gamble] 0.140 0.348 0 1 
[Neg. Score] 0.478 0.501 0 1 
[Group A] X [Neg. Score] 0.227 0.420 0 1 
Refer to Table 7. Round 1 WTP and round 2 WTP are simply the nominal WTP 
for the coin flip in rounds 1 and 2. Participants who did not report a valid WTP are not 
included in the regressions.5   There was also one observation in round 1 where no 
gambles were taken, and five observations in round 2 where no gambles were taken. 
Because there is potentially a large difference in the true risk preferences of someone 
who did not take any gambles and someone who took at least one gamble, these 
                                                          
5 In other words, if subjects mixed gambles and sure values rather than beginning with gamble and then 
moving to sure values at some point, then they were not included in the regression. Several preliminary 
regressions were done using the number of gambles as one’s risk preference estimation, but this yielded no 
correlations. It is likely that people who did not understand the game did not report a valid willingness-to-
pay for risk and therefore do not need to be included in the analysis.  
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observations are dropped.  I investigate what changes risk preferences along a spectrum 
of risk rather than what makes someone go from totally risk averse to willing to take a 
risk. 6  This resulted in 129 usable observations for round 1 of the game and 152 
observations for round 2 of the game.   
Round 2 WTP excluding round 1 gamblers equals WTP for the risky prospect in 
round 2 of the game, but all observations where the participant had to flip the coin in 
round 1 are dropped. The effect on behavior of being endowed a sure value of points may 
be different from winning or losing the coin flip. Given this difference in how outcomes 
may affect behavior, the results should be analyzed both including and not including 
those who had to gamble in round 1 of the game. 
WTP difference is defined as [round 2 WTP] – [round 1 WTP]. This is analyzed 
to see how risk preferences changed between the rounds, rather than see differences in 
final states of WTP. Two participants recorded valid WTP values in round 1, but not 
round 2. Therefore, there were 127 usable observations for the WTP difference 
regressions.  
 Independent demographic variables are defined exactly the same as they were in 
experiment 1. In this experiment I include another demographic variable in the model: 
skydiver. In order to control for baseline risk preferences, I asked the participants “would 
you go skydiving if you had the opportunity?” under the assumption that people who like 
skydiving are generally more risk-seeking than those who do not.  
                                                          
6 It should be noted that doing this means that changes in WTP for the risky prospect may be over-
estimated on average. 
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 There are several independent round 1 outcome variables. Score after round 1 of 
the game, or round 1 score, is simply the final nominal outcome of round 1 including the 
12 point loss. Lost the gamble is a dummy variable defined as round 1 score equal to -12, 
as only those who lost the gamble could have -12 points. Won the gamble is a dummy 
variable defined as round 1 score equal to 8, as only those who won the gamble could 
possibly have 8 points. Finally, negative score is a dummy variable defined as having a 
score lower than 0, and this again is interacted with the group A dummy variable in order 
to observe differences in how the groups may react to having a negative score.  
Table 8: Regressions of WTP in Experiment 2 
 Round 1 Round 1 Round 2 Round 2 WTP 
Difference 
WTP 
Difference 
Group A 0.696 2.305** 0.641 1.723 -0.238 -0.852 
 (0.509) (1.163) (0.555) (1.275) (0.492) (1.157) 
Female -0.501 -0.764 -0.044 0.121 0.193 0.543 
 (0.519) (0.680) (0.559) (0.769) (0.499) (0.667) 
[Group A] X [Female] - 0.923 - -0.385 - -0.953 
 - (1.050) - (1.126) - (1.020) 
Nonwhite -0.647 -1.068 -0.008 -0.479 0.102 0.274 
 (0.551) (0.723) (0.604) (0.804) (0.536) (0.707) 
[Group A] X [Nonwhite] - 0.888 - 1.019 - -0.432 
 - (1.111) - (1.229) - (1.095) 
Skydiver 1.251* 2.607*** 0.635 1.485 -0.779 -1.411 
 (0.655) (0.896) (0.675) (0.987) (0.626) (0.888) 
[Group A] X [Skydiver] - -2.818** - -1.559 - 1.412 
 - (1.278) - (1.359) - (1.268) 
R2 0.053 0.092 0.014 0.028 0.015 0.030 
n 129 129 152 152 127 127 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate significance to the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
Refer to Table 8 for the discussion of predictions 1 through 3.  
Prediction 1:    Prediction 1 states that group A should be more risky than group B in 
round 1. In the model where demographics are interacted with the group A variable, 
group A reported higher WTP than group B at the 5% significance level. This 
significance disappears in my other model, so this finding is not robust. The coefficient 
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on group A is positive in both models, so there is evidence that group A tended to be 
slightly more risky than group B in round 1, supporting prediction 1.  
Prediction 2: Prediction 2 states that group B should be more risky than group A in round 
2. In neither models was the group A variable statistically significant. Moreover, in both 
models the coefficient on the group A variable is positive, which is directly contrary to 
my prediction. My results do not support prediction 2. 
Prediction 3: Prediction 3 states that group B should become risky faster than group A 
becomes risky in round 2. In neither models of WTP differences was the group A 
variable statistically significant. The coefficient on group A in both models is negative, 
suggesting either group B become less risky slower than group A, or group B became 
more risky faster than group A, giving some support to prediction 3.  
 Another result worth commenting on is the effect of being a skydiver in round 1 
of the experiment. The skydiver variable is included to see how being a generally risky 
person affects decision-making. To understand the overall effect of being a more risky 
person, non-skydivers in both groups should be compared, and skydivers in both groups 
should be compared. The comparison of skydivers in both groups is captured by adding 
the coefficient of the group A variable with the group A skydiver variable. An F-test 
reveals a 90% chance for the sum of the coefficients to be 0. The comparison of non-
skydivers in both groups is captured by the coefficient on the group A variable, which is 
positive, although not conclusive, as to the magnitude of the effect. Based on these results, 
skydivers react to information of loss less than non-skydivers in terms of risk preferences. 
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Standard deviations are in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicate significance to the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
Table 9: Regressions of Round 2 WTP in Experiment 2 Accounting for Uncertainty Resolution after Round 1 
R1 Outcome Variable Score Score Score Score Neg. score Neg. score Neg. score Neg. score Lost Lost Won Won 
Group A 0.655 2.087* 1.412 4.758** 0.594 2.095 1.518* 4.123** 0.623 2.433* 0.704 1.626 
 (0.543) (1.252) (0.894) (1.793) (0.550) (1.363) (0.899) (1.890) (0.543) (1.300) (0.553) (1.304) 
Female 0.144 0.510 -0.852 0.044 0.068 0.359 -0.891 0.019 0.118 0.480 -0.012 0.148 
 (0.551) (0.762) (0.890) (1.163) (0.556) (0.771) (0.870) (1.127) (0.550) (0.757) (0.556) (0.766) 
[Group A] X [Female] - -0.718 - -2.571 - -0.596 - -2.552 - -0.706 - -0.380 
 - (1.106) - (1.736) - (1.121) - (1.719) - (1.101) - (1.120) 
Nonwhite -0.155 -0.760 0.511 -0.162 -0.158 -0.756 0.643 0.186 -0.114 -0.603 -0.097 -0.717 
 (0.593) (0.790) (0.960) (1.162) (0.602) (0.808) (0.968) (1.208) (0.592) (0.783) (0.603) (0.814) 
[Group A] X [Nonwhite] - 1.248 - 1.366 - 1.240 - 0.991 - 1.078 - 1.282 
 - (1.202) - (1.994) - (1.225) - (2.031) - (1.197) - (1.231) 
Skydiver 0.669 1.677* 0.577 2.310 0.665 1.598 0.524 2.179 0.587 1.506 0.694 1.606 
 (0.660) (0.964) (1.015) (1.448) (0.668) (0.979) (1.008) (1.450) (0.660) (0.960) (0.672) (0.985) 
[Group A] X [Skydiver] - -1.784 - -3.397* - -1.680 - -3.219 - -1.629 - -1.648 
 - (1.326) - (1.990) - (1.346) - (1.998) - (1.322) - (1.354) 
R1 score -0.094*** -0.132*** -0.003 0.052 -        
 (0.033) (0.047) (0.136) (0.160)         
[Group A] X [R1 score] - 0.068 - -0.405         
 - (0.067) - (0.291)         
Neg. score     1.137** 1.543** -0.751 -1.616     
     (0.556) (0.781) (0.970) (1.355)     
[Group A] X [Neg. score]     - -0.696 - 2.081     
     - (1.121) - (1.895)     
Lost         1.625*** 2.468***   
         (0.580) (0.798)   
[Group A] X [Lost]         - -1.712   
         - (1.161)   
Won           -1.065* -1.416 
           (0.615) (0.888) 
[Group A] X [Won]           - 0.550 
           - (1.243) 
R2 0.065 0.090 0.063 0.202 0.041 0.061 0.073 0.191 0.064 0.094 0.034 0.051 
Adjusted R2 - - - 0.058 - - - 0.046 - - - - 
n 152 152 60 60 152 152 60 60 152 152 152 152 
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Refer to Table 9 for the discussion of predictions 4 through 7. 
Prediction 4: Prediction 4 states that as participants’ scores increase in round 1, WTP 
should decrease in round 2. The results support this prediction at the 1% significance 
level in the models of round 2 WTP which include round 1 gamblers in the sample. This 
significance disappears when round 1 gamblers are removed from the sample. This result 
suggests that winning or losing the gamble may be the most impactful round 1 outcome 
on round 2 behavior.  
Prediction 5: Prediction 5 states that if 0 is a reference point around which players 
determine whether they are in the domain of loss or domain of gain, then negative scores 
in round 1 should be correlated with higher WTP in round 2. The results support this 
prediction at the 5% significance level in the models of round 2 WTP which include 
round 1 gamblers in the sample. This significance also disappears when round 1 gamblers 
are removed from the sample. Based on this result, winning or losing the gamble may be 
the most impactful round 1 outcome on round 2 behavior, especially considering anyone 
who lost the gamble would have a negative score at the conclusion of round 1. 
Prediction 6: Prediction 6 states that if a participant lost the gamble in round 1, then 
round 2 WTP should increase. The results support this prediction at the 1% significance 
level in both models of round 2 WTP.  
Prediction 7: Prediction 7 states that if a participant won the gamble in round 1, then 
round 2 WTP should decrease. The results do not show strong support for this prediction. 
This may be due to the fact that gains do not generate utility at the same speed as losses 
according to PT. Therefore the effect of gains on behavior may not be as pronounced as 
the effect of losses on behavior.  
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D. Discussion of Results for Experiment 2 
Overall, the predictions concerning uncertainty resolution tend to be supported by 
the results. Also, prediction 1 and prediction 3 have some evidence to support them. 
There are two results in experiment 2 that require more discussion. First, there is 
evidence that those who had to gamble in round 1 behaved significantly differently than 
those who did not have to gamble in round 1. Second, in many regressions the opposite of 
prediction 2 was true: group A had a higher WTP for the risky prospect than group B. I 
will address both of these results.  
Those who had to gamble in round 1 seem to behave differently than those who 
did not have to gamble in round 1 with regards to the effect of the 12 point loss. First, 
notice that the coefficient on the group A variable has a higher significance level and a 
larger coefficient in the regressions excluding round 1 gamblers. This result suggests that 
the effect of the 12 point loss was greater among those who did not gamble.  It is possible 
that when participants gambled, their focus became not their overall performances in the 
game, but rather their performances in the gamble. In this case a loss of points in the 
game is unrelated to the gamble outcome in the minds of gambling participants, and 
therefore the loss of points does not affect gamblers’ behaviors across groups.  
Second, in the regressions which looked at the effect of score or negative score on 
round 2 WTP, any significant results disappear when round 1 gamblers are removed from 
the sample. It is possible that the effects of winning or losing the gamble in round 1 have 
skewed the results in the regressions which include gamblers. This result may be 
evidence for a difference between reactions to a random endowment of points and 
reactions to the outcome of a gamble which one took. It is important to keep in mind that 
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a significant amount of observations were dropped in the regressions not including round 
1 gamblers, so it may be worth investigating the effects of prior outcomes in this type of 
experiment again with a larger sample size.  
In every regression of round 2 WTP, group A has a positive coefficient, and 
several regressions report that this result is statistically significant. This result is totally 
contrary to my prediction about the effect of the 12 point loss. There may be several 
reasons for this. 
 First, it is possible that group B did not see the loss of points as an income loss, 
but rather as a change of rules. If group B is worried that there are other rules about 
which they do not know, they may become inherently more risk-averse to avoid losses in 
the face of another unknown rule.  
Second, it is possible that respondents are exhibiting status quo bias with regards 
to their round 1 WTP for the risky prospect. In other words, they simply do not want to 
change their risk profiles between rounds. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) 
perform an experiment where some people were given a stock portfolio of a certain risk 
level, and then were given the option to change that risk level. The majority of 
respondents did not change the risk level of their portfolios. Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler say that there is a status quo bias for risk in this situation. It is possible that the 
same effect is being observed here. The propensity for status quo bias to occur may have 
also been enhanced because the same exact game table was used between rounds 1 and 2. 
Using two different game types in future experiments may help to minimize the effects of 
status quo bias in risk preferences.  
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 To further motivate the argument that status quo bias is affecting the results, 
consider the following. In round 1, group A was given information that put them in the 
domain of loss, and group B’s information put them almost exclusively in the domain of 
gain, save the possibility of losing the gamble. It is possible that only over one round, 
status quo bias is stronger than the effect of any other change.  In order to investigate this 
possibility more closely, consider the following table which shows the difference in WTP 
for the risky prospect between rounds for both groups. WTP difference is calculated as 
WTP in round 2 minus WTP in round 1.  
Table 10: Comparison of Willingness-to-Pay Differences Between Rounds 1 and 2 of 
Both Groups 
WTP 
Difference 
Group A Group B Total 
-16 0 2 2 
-10 0 1 1 
-8 2 0 2 
-7 1 0 1 
-6 1 1 2 
-5 1 0 1 
-4 1 0 1 
-3 3 3 6 
-2 2 5 7 
-1 6 8 14 
0 20 19 39 
1 7 14 21 
2 5 7 12 
3 4 5 9 
4 1 3 4 
5 2 2 4 
6 1 1 2 
7 1 1 2 
9 2 0 2 
Total 60 72 132 
 Refer to Table 10. A significant amount of people in both groups did not change 
their WTP for the risky prospect between the rounds. There is a slight tendency in group 
B to increase risk between the rounds, but a regression of WTP difference including the 
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group dummy variable yielded no statistically significant results. Given this result, there 
is evidence that a status quo effect for risk preferences was present in my experiment, and 
this minimized the effect of the 12 point loss on behavior.  
 In summary, I can conclude that information regarding a coming change in points 
does affect the reference point, and the outcomes of prior gambles do affect behavior in 
future rounds. I find no evidence that the loss of points caused a change in behavior 
between groups A and B. 
VI. Conclusions 
A. Considering the effectiveness of my adaptation to prospect theory 
My adaptation of PT accounts for the effect surprise has on the evaluations of 
future decisions in games with several rounds. The value function I originally proposed is 
written below. As a reminder, let Vt represent the value of a given prospect in round t of a 
multi-round round game, xi represent the given prospect in round t, pi represent the 
probability of xi, xt-1 represent the outcome of round t-1 in the game, ψt-1 represent the 
location of the expectations-based reference point along the x-axis of the value function, 
and ut-1 represent the value function for the outcome of round t-1.  
Vt=∑ 𝝅(𝒑𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ) ∗ 𝒗[𝒙𝒊 + 𝒖𝒕−𝟏(𝒙𝒕−𝟏 − ψ𝒕−𝟏 )] 
According to this model, negative surprises in time period 1 cause prospects to be 
evaluated more negatively in time period 2, and positive surprises in time period 1 cause 
prospects to be evaluated more positively in time period 2. Finally, surprises affect 
behavior in the second time period more as the surprise grows, and likewise the more one 
expects an outcome the less that outcome affects the evaluation of prospects in the second 
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round. I also hypothesized that surprises outcomes increase the utility one experiences for 
both negative and positive outcomes compared to expected outcomes.  
 Based on my results, there is strong evidence that surprise does increase the utility 
of outcomes, but I was unable to find any evidence that surprises are affecting the 
evaluation of future prospects differently than expected outcomes. There are still several 
variables influencing decision-making behavior that are unaccounted for by the variables 
I test in this paper.  
 Beyond just my experimental results, the theory is only valuable if it can 
sufficiently explain behavior in the real world. My findings support Vanhamme and 
Snelders’s (2001) conclusion that surprise is associated with increased consumer 
satisfaction. My theory also provides a reasonable explanation as to why PEAD, strategic 
earnings forecasts by firms, and non-linear reactions by investors to expected and 
unexpected monetary policy changes occur. Earnings surprises cause the value of a 
company to be greater than had that company’s earnings not been a surprise, increasing 
demand for their stocks. Warning of long-term structural losses reduces negative investor 
reactions to those losses. Unexpected monetary policy changes discourage investors more 
than expected monetary policy changes.  In each situation, the theory that surprise 
outcomes increase the utility magnitude of outcomes can be applied to give a reasonable 
explanation for why these behaviors occur. But in none of these situations do the factors 
that influence the current decision result solely from the weighting of current prospects 
and the outcome of previous time period, as my theory suggests.  
 As it stands, the adaptation to PT I propose is only functional in two round games. 
This may not be the best model for decision-making behavior in real life, because there 
are countless scenarios in which more than just the immediately previous round may 
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affect behavior. Loewenstein and Elster (1992) use an example of seeing a movie to show 
that the effects of reference point shift following an event may be long lasting. If I see an 
incredibly good movie, 15 years from now I may not remember exactly what happens in 
the movie, but my tastes for movies will still be altered.  Clearly, taste for movies is not 
only affected by how you felt about the one movie you had watched previous to the 
current one.   
The effect of prior outcomes on future evaluations may be a ratio of the effect of 
the previous outcome over the average effects of all previous rounds, keeping in mind 
that utility of an outcome increases as surprise increases. A model fitting these 
characteristics looks like this: 
Vt=∑ 𝝅(𝒑𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ) ∗ 𝒗[𝒙𝒊 + 𝒖𝒕−𝟏(𝒙𝒕−𝟏)/ ∑ 𝒖(𝒙𝒏)
𝒏
𝒕=𝟏 ] 
 According to this model, surprise has the largest effect on behavior in early 
rounds, or in the round immediately following the surprise. As the game goes on, it takes 
either consistently different results or a very large surprise in order to influence 
behavior.7  
 Despite the fact that my findings show surprise increases reference point 
adaptation following an outcome, there are intuitive scenarios where this may not be true. 
For example, consider a game that has been repeating for a very long time where there is 
a safe option A and a risky option B. In each round, my prospects are exactly the same. I 
always choose the safe option, and always get the payoff associated with the safe option. 
If I choose the safe option and something else happens, my reference point may not shift 
as I perceive this surprise as an error rather than new information that needs to be 
                                                          
7 This model may explain behavior in games with relatively few rounds well. In truly infinitely repeating 
games, a more complex function which accounts for forgetting some outcomes over time may be even 
better at explaining behavior.  
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accounted for. In a game which has just started, a surprise outcome may be seen as new 
information that needs to be weighted heavily into the evaluation of prospects. More 
research into how surprise affects reference point shift must be done. Moreover, 
including reference point shift in the multi-round PT value function may provide a better 
model of behavior in multiple rounds. 
 In summary, my adaptation to PT brings us a step closer to explaining behavior in 
games with multiple rounds, but more research and adjustment of the theory must be 
done to have a truly comprehensive model of what influences decision-making. The 
theory can be applied to explain behaviors we observe to a limited degree, and the data 
from my experiments supports the theory’s predictions concerning utility. But the 
majority of situations in life are not simple two round games as the theory assumes. 
Therefore, my adaptation to PT is strongest in terms of explaining behavior in an 
experimental setting with two round games. A better model for behavior in games with 
multiple rounds will account for the effects that many rounds have on behavior, rates of 
forgetting distant outcomes, and varying levels of ex-post reference point shift.  
B. Potential improvements to methods 
If I were to perform this experiment again, I would consider the following 
changes to the methods: 
At a small liberal arts college, I find that the most efficient way in terms of time 
for gathering responses to an experimental survey is to gather participants during class 
times. But rather than assign one class to one experimental group and another class to 
another experimental group as I did, each class could be split such that one half of the 
class is in one experimental group, and the other half of the class is in the other 
experimental group. This would be an improvement because the factors that influence the 
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time students decide to take a class, 8:00 AM, 11:00 AM, 2:30 PM, may also affect that 
person’s decision-making tendencies in general. For example, if all classes assigned to 
group A happened to be the earlier segment of that class, then the average risk profile of 
group A may be systematically different than the average risk profile of group B. It may 
take more time to run the experiment twice for each class, but it will help to ensure an 
representative distribution of decision-making profiles between the experimental groups. 
Introduction level classes should be used to collect participants, and if not all 
introduction level classes are used, then classes should be selected randomly. It is 
possible that one’s major influences the way in which one makes decisions, or particular 
decision-makers self-select into certain majors. By only using introduction level classes, 
a wider variety of majors or decision-making profiles will be present in the data, making 
the sample better represent the population.  Also the class which a participant was in or 
the major that class is related to should be recorded and the effects of class tested for so 
the analysis can control for those differences.  I did not record data on which classes 
participants came from, so I cannot determine if class influenced decision-making.  
If I had adequate resources, I would use laptop computers or tablets with the 
experiments and instructions pre-programmed to collect responses rather than individuals 
filling out papers. This would reduce the effect of inconsistencies in how instructions are 
given, and also prevents respondents from providing illegible or inappropriate answers.  
In experiment 1, explicitly ordinal prompts which allow the participant to 
compare expected or surprise outcomes could be used. This type of question may give a 
more confident result as to how surprise affects utility. If a 1 to 10 point scale is used to 
approximate utility as I did, then ordered logits or ordered probits may be considered as 
analysis tools rather than ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. These analysis tools 
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might better capture relationships on a 1-10 scale because there are likely non-linear 
differences between the intervals on such a scale, and OLS does not capture non-linear 
relationships as well as the other analysis methods. 
When using Arkes et al.’s (2008) methods of determining reference point shift, 
we should consider the potential for a difference in how people respond to a question 
when it is asked in terms of final states of wealth versus changes in wealth.  More 
research needs to be done into this topic before any claims can be made as to which way 
of framing a question is the “better” method. 
In experiment 2, a third group which experiences no change in points should be 
included in the study. This would allow for more precise observation of how the effects 
of general uncertainty resolution affect behavior without the presence of income shocks.  
Whether participants perform the game section of the experiment in the presence 
of other participants or by themselves may affect their responses. For example, knowing 
how many others gambled in round 1 may influence people’s WTP for the risky prospect 
in round 2 due to social pressure. Also if respondents all see each other facing the same 
loss, then the utility of that loss may be different compared to had each individual thought 
the loss only applied to them. The incentives for genuine play may also affect how a 
group setting affects behavior. For example, I used a raffle, so each individual’s success 
was also a function of everyone else’s success. If the incentive is simply a quantity of 
candy associated with points, then your success is independent of everyone else’s success. 
Future researchers should consider how the setting of an experiment may affect behavior 
given the incentive system that the experiment implements.  
My incentive system could be improved to elicit more realistic behavior. I told 
respondents that everyone would receive at least one raffle ticket, even if their scores 
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were negative. This means that if you lost the gamble in round 1, it was very difficult to 
gain any more points in round 2.  Respondents who lost the first gamble may have lost 
hope and only taken the risky options or simply gave up trying to make any rational 
decision.8  An initial endowment of points would have allowed the potential for marginal 
benefit to exist at every point-level. I chose not to do this in order to avoid the potential 
for either a house money effect or endowment effect affecting people’s risk preferences 
in the first round of the game. In the second round a significant amount of people 
exclusively chose the risky prospect, so it is possible that some people did lose hope. 
Therefore, using an initial endowment of points to ensure marginal benefit at all point 
levels following an income shock may be a better incentive system. 
The surprise in the game portion of the experiment could also be refined.  A 
totally unsolicited change in points may not be perceived as an income shock by 
participants, but rather as a change of rules. In this case, the surprise may actually 
inherently increase risk-aversion as participants adjust their strategies to account for 
unknown rules of the game. Rather than give participants absolutely no expectation of a 
point change, it may be better to tell participants something may happen, but that it is 
extremely unlikely. Then, the extremely unlikely thing ends up happening. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) note that very low probabilities tend to be weighted as being more 
likely than they actually are by people. Nonetheless, an outcome which had a 
conservative expectation is still more surprising than an outcome with a strong 
expectation, and so the effect of surprise in this case should still be observable.  
                                                          
8 This issue may shed light on why we are more risk-seeking in the domain of loss. It is possible that there 
are enough situations in life where if you want to earn any marginal benefit, you need to be above a certain 
threshold. If you are far enough below that threshold, then the only possible way to pass the threshold is by 
taking a risk, as a safe bet is essentially worthless at that point. This may also be evidence for the 
possibility of multiple reference points: where I am now, and where I want to be/expect to be.  
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The experiment can also easily be adjusted to test for the effects on behavior of all 
other surprise categories which are outlined in Table 1, such as positive surprises and 
surprises of varying magnitudes. I decided to test for negative surprises first, because as 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) put it, losses loom larger than gains, and so the effect of 
losses on behavior would be easier to detect than the effect of gains on behavior. But the 
theory does not have full empirical support until all types of positive surprises are shown 
to increase utility more than equal expected positive outcomes. This could be done 
simply by adjusting the point surprise in experiment 2, but include 5 distinct groups 
rather than two. These groups would be designated as the large loss group, the small loss 
group, the no change group, the small gain group, and the large gain group. In this way, 
the full range of possible surprises is investigated.  
C. Suggestions for future research  
 It is possible that a relatively small sample, unevenly distributed participants 
between the experimental groups, misplaced incentives in my experimental design, and 
other behavioral effects may have inhibited my detection of the effects surprise has on 
risk in experiment 2. Nonetheless, the strong evidence for the effect surprise has on utility 
found in experiment 1 is justification to study how surprise affects behavior more in 
general. 
 I have also mentioned throughout the paper other possibilities for future research 
which I encountered during this study. They are summarized in the list that follows.   
1. Concerning Arkes et al.’s (2008) method for estimating reference point shift, 
there may be a difference in how people respond to the question when it is asked 
in terms of final states of wealth versus changes in wealth.  This difference should 
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be investigated so that the optimal methods for determining reference point shift 
are established for future research.  
2. I find significant evidence which points towards an inverse relationship between 
marginal utility of outcomes and ex-post reference point shift. This relationship 
should be investigated more. In particular, future research should consider if 
consciously deciding to react less to a particular outcome increases adaptation to 
that outcome, allowing one to make decisions differently than had one reacted 
rather than adapted. Such a result would provide theoretical and empirical support 
for the claim that staying calm in a crisis leads to “better,” or at least different 
evaluations of prospects.  
3. It appears that winning or losing the gamble was the primary variable causing 
behavior to change in round 2 of experiment 2. There should be more research 
into how people react to outcomes which exist on a binomial scale compared to 
outcomes which exist on a continuous scale. This research may lead to policy 
implications of how to maximize the effect of income shocks: simply winning or 
losing may be what matters most, not how much you win or lose by. 
4. The experiment should be performed using a game of more than two rounds to see 
how expected and unexpected income shocks change behavior differently over 
time. For example, several rounds could be played to see if people develop an 
equilibrium strategy. Once equilibrium strategies have been established, an 
income shock could be administered to see how strategies change. It could then be 
seen if people return to their original equilibrium strategies, and if so under what 
conditions or how long it takes. If people do not return to their original 
equilibrium strategies, then it would be of interest to compare their new 
equilibriums with their old equilibriums. One could also vary the timing of the 
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announcement of a loss or gain to see how earlier or later announcements affect 
the utility of an outcome. For example, does an early announcement get forgotten, 
causing ex-post utility to increase, or does it allow for more reference point 
adaptation over time, causing ex-post utility to decrease? Can both of these effects 
take place under different circumstances? These are questions that can be 
answered by more research into how the timing of warnings affects behavior.  
 
D. Policy implications 
The specific implications on policy of how surprise outcomes affect behavior is 
not very complicated. Simply put, if you want a policy to have a more pronounced effect, 
then make the policy announcement or enactment surprising. If you want a policy to have 
a less pronounced effect, then give people some expectation of the policy.  I will show 
several examples of how surprise is already used in policy and in other aspects of life. 
Then I will discuss potential complications of using surprise for influencing the effect of 
policy.  
Consider again the Federal Reserve. The Fed will occasionally change interest 
rates as a surprise, and Chang has shown that these surprise interest rate changes have a 
significantly larger effect on the economy than announced changes. It is possible the Fed 
is consciously deciding whether to use surprise to change the magnitude of the effects of 
its policies. In this case, surprise affects aggregate behavior, but surprise is also used by 
marketing agencies to affect individual decisions.   
Consider any standard infomercial. The infomercial is trying its hardest to sell 
you on the latest widget. The infomercial uses flashing lights, loud noises, an interesting 
character, anything to catch your attention and increase the feeling of surprise. Perhaps 
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the most iconic tactic is simply the phrase, “but wait, there’s more!” Marketing agencies 
realize that people set values on offers as they receive them. If you break the offer into 
several parts and make each part seem surprising, then people set a marginally higher 
value on the widget as a whole when each surprising part is added. By making certain 
aspects of the widget surprising, you have effectively increased the value of the widget 
without actually changing the widget.  
Perhaps the most ancient use of surprise in influencing behavior in the real world 
is in barter trade. A vendor will initially set an incredibly high price so that the 
“appropriate” price is perceived as surprisingly low, making what may still be a high 
price seem like a good deal.  Thus the customer is more prone to make a purchase 
compared to if the vendor had not set an outrageously high price to begin with.  
The main complication with using surprise to influence policy is that if it is used 
too often, then the surprise is no longer surprising. For example, if the Fed uses surprise 
interest rate changes too often, then people will begin to expect the changes, and the 
effect is diminished. After hearing thousands of infomercials, the “wait, there’s more!” 
line becomes tedious rather than surprising. If you spend enough time with barterers, you 
begin to learn that if they set the first price it is always outrageously high. Therefore, 
anyone who wants to use surprise to influence policy should keep in mind that surprise 
should be used sparingly if the effect of surprise is what makes the policy effective in the 
first place.  
The other side to using surprise to enhance the effects of policy is that 
expectations can be used to reduce the effect of policy on behavior. This policy strategy 
should be used warily though. As I discussed with the finding of Kasznik and Lev (1995), 
it is possible that announcements aimed at giving people expectations can have just as 
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significant an effect as a surprise outcome itself. Therefore one must be strategic in how 
you set expectations. Making an announcement big, loud, and generally surprising will 
still have a surprise effect on behavior much like the outcome would have if it were a 
surprise. If you want to set expectations without creating a surprise effect with your 
announcement or warning, then it is best to quietly give just enough information for 
people to slowly formulate an expectation on their own.  
E. Final statement 
 If expectations affect reference point formation, then prospect theory suggests that 
surprise outcomes will generate more utility than expected outcomes. If the utility of 
prior outcomes affects future decisions, then surprise outcomes may affect behavior 
differently than expected outcomes.  
The results of my experiments suggest that reference points are affected by 
expectations, that surprise outcomes do generate more utility than expected outcomes, 
and that the outcomes of gambles do affect future evaluation of prospects. The results do 
not provide strong evidence that surprise outcomes are affecting behavior differently 
from expected outcomes in decisions under risk. There is reason to believe that I find no 
evidence of a difference in behavior following expected and unexpected outcomes due to 
other well-documented behavioral effects having a greater influence on behavior than 
what I test for.  
There is also evidence for an inverse relationship between marginal utility of 
outcomes and reference point shift. If this relationship is confirmed in further studies, 
there may be policy implications concerning the ability to alter people’s reactiveness or 
adaptability toward outcomes.   
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Given my results, more research into how surprise affects utility, risk preferences, 
and reference point adaptation is warranted.   
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Appendix 
Figure A: Group A Experimental Packet 
 
Experimental Survey A 
 
Hello,  
Thank you for taking part in this study. This entire survey should take approximately 20 minutes 
for everyone to complete.  It is divided into three sections as follows: 
Section 1, Response to a Situation 
In this section you will be presented with a hypothetical situation. You will then be asked to 
record your subjective responses to this situation.  
Section 2, Basic Demographic Information 
In this section you will simply answer questions about yourself. 
Section 3, The Two-Round Game 
In this section you will play a game. The goal of the game is to make as many points as you can. 
Those points will be converted into raffle tickets at the end of the experiment such that the 
more points you have the more raffle tickets you get. The rules of the game will be explained at 
the beginning of Section 3. 
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Section 1 
Response to a Situation 
Consider the following: 
You are the owner of a small business. All year every year your monthly profits are 
$100,000. This value fluctuates from time to time, but luckily your company has an 
incredibly skilled adviser. She is always able to predict when and how the company's 
profits will change.  Last month your profits fell by $20,000. Your adviser did not predict 
this, so the change was totally unexpected. 
 
Question 1: 
On a scale of 1 to 10, how unhappy does this make you?  
1 is little to no unhappiness, 10 is extreme unhappiness. 
Answer: _______ 
 
Question 2: 
In the situation above your profits fell last month. How much money would you have to lose 
again this month to feel equally unhappy? Note that this is not necessarily the same value of 
money lost last month, it is the value of money lost this month that would make you feel equally 
unhappy with last month.  
Answer: $_________ 
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Section 2 
Demographic Information 
Answer the following questions based on your own situation. 
Question 1: 
What is your age? 
Answer: ______ 
 
Question 2: 
What is your sex? 
Circle one:     Female       Male 
 
Question 3: 
What race or ethnic origin do you most closely identify with? 
Circle one:  Black/African American          White      Hispanic or Latino     Asian/Pacific Islander                                                                                                  
                                Native American or American Indian      Other        Two or more 
 
Question 4: 
What is(are) your major(s) or field(s) of study? 
Answer: __________________________ 
 
Question 5:  
Would you ever going skydiving if you had the opportunity? 
Circle one:     Yes          No 
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Section 3 
The Two-Round Game 
Description of the Game and Rules:  
In this game your goal is to get as many points as you can. These points will then be 
converted into raffle tickets after the experiment is done such that the more points you 
have the more tickets you receive. Everyone will receive at least 1 ticket.    
In the table below there are 17 rows. In each row you have the option to either gamble 
for points or take a sure value of points. You must indicate at each row whether you 
want to gamble, G, or take the sure value, S. After everyone has filled in their tables, a 
random number based on the number of rows in the game table will be drawn using a 
random number generator. Everyone will receive the payoff they chose associated with 
whatever row is chosen by the random number generator. For example in the practice 
table below, if the number drawn is 2 and I chose to gamble at row 2, then I would 
gamble. If I chose sure value, I would receive 2 points. 
The researcher will flip a coin for each person who gambled. Heads is a win, tails is a loss. 
To better understand the game, we will do a practice round. This round will not count 
towards your point total, it is simply to help you understand the game before we play 
for real. 
 
Row 
Number 
Gamble Receive 
Sure Value 
Choice 
(S or G) 
1 50/50 chance to win 6 points 1 point  
2 50/50 chance to win 6 points 2 points  
3 50/50 chance to win 6 points 3 points  
4 50/50 chance to win 6 points 4 points  
5 50/50 chance to win 6 points 5 points  
G = GAMBLE 
S = SURE VALUE 
Practice Round RESULT: 
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We will play the game all together round by round.  Take note that after the conclusion 
of round 1, I will take 12 points away from your earnings.  After that, we will begin 
round 2. 
 
Round 1 
Row 
Number 
Gamble Receive 
Sure Value 
Choice 
(S or G) 
1 50/50 chance to win 20 points 0 points  
2 50/50 chance to win 20 points 1 points  
3 50/50 chance to win 20 points 2 points  
4 50/50 chance to win 20 points 3 points  
5 50/50 chance to win 20 points 4 points  
6 50/50 chance to win 20 points 5 points  
7 50/50 chance to win 20 points 6 points  
8 50/50 chance to win 20 points 7 points  
9 50/50 chance to win 20 points 8 points  
10 50/50 chance to win 20 points 9 points  
11 50/50 chance to win 20 points 10 points  
12 50/50 chance to win 20 points 11 points  
13 50/50 chance to win 20 points 12 points  
14 50/50 chance to win 20 points 13 points  
15 50/50 chance to win 20 points 14 points  
16 50/50 chance to win 20 points 15 points  
17 50/50 chance to win 20 points 16 points  
 
G = GAMBLE 
S = SURE VALUE 
Round 1 RESULT:_________ 
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Round 2 
Row 
Number 
Gamble Receive 
Sure Value 
Choice 
(S or G) 
1 50/50 chance to win 20 points 0 points  
2 50/50 chance to win 20 points 1 points  
3 50/50 chance to win 20 points 2 points  
4 50/50 chance to win 20 points 3 points  
5 50/50 chance to win 20 points 4 points  
6 50/50 chance to win 20 points 5 points  
7 50/50 chance to win 20 points 6 points  
8 50/50 chance to win 20 points 7 points  
9 50/50 chance to win 20 points 8 points  
10 50/50 chance to win 20 points 9 points  
11 50/50 chance to win 20 points 10 points  
12 50/50 chance to win 20 points 11 points  
13 50/50 chance to win 20 points 12 points  
14 50/50 chance to win 20 points 13 points  
15 50/50 chance to win 20 points 14 points  
16 50/50 chance to win 20 points 15 points  
17 50/50 chance to win 20 points 16 points  
 
G = GAMBLE 
S = SURE VALUE 
Round 2 RESULT:_________ 
 
Total Earnings:__________ 
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Figure B: Group B Experimental Packet 
 
Experimental Survey B 
Hello,  
Thank you for taking part in this study. This entire survey should take approximately 10 minutes 
for everyone to complete.  It is divided into three sections as follows: 
Section 1, Response to a Situation 
In this section you will be presented with a hypothetical situation. You will then be asked to 
record your subjective responses to this situation.  
Section 2, Basic Demographic Information 
In this section you will simply answer questions about yourself. 
Section 3, The Two Round Game 
In this section you will play a game. The goal of the game is to make as many points as you can. 
Those points will be converted into raffle tickets at the end of the experiment such that the 
more points you have the more raffle tickets you get. The rules of the game will be explained at 
the beginning of Section 3. 
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Section 1 
Response to a Situation 
Consider the following: 
You are the owner of a small business. All year every year your monthly profits are 
$100,000. This value fluctuates from time to time, but luckily your company has an 
incredibly skilled adviser. She is always able to predict when and how the company's 
profits will change.  Last month your profits fell by $20,000. Your adviser did predict this, 
so the change was totally expected. 
 
Question 1: 
On a scale of 1 to 10, how unhappy does this make you?  
1 is little to no unhappiness, 10 is extreme unhappiness. 
Answer: _______ 
 
Question 2: 
In the situation above your profits fell last month. How much money would you have to lose 
again this month to feel equally unhappy? Note that this is not necessarily the same value of 
money lost last month, it is the value of money lost this month that would make you feel equally 
unhappy with last month.  
Answer: $_________ 
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Section 2 
Demographic Information 
Answer the following questions based on your own situation. 
 
Question 1: 
What is your age? 
Answer: ______ 
 
Question 2: 
What is your sex? 
Circle one:     Female       Male 
 
Question 3: 
What race or ethnic origin do you most closely identify with? 
Circle one:  Black/African American          White      Hispanic or Latino     Asian/Pacific Islander                                                                                                  
                                Native American or American Indian      Other        Two or more 
 
Question 4: 
What is(are) your major(s) or field(s) of study? 
Answer: __________________________ 
 
Question 5:  
Would you ever going skydiving if you had the opportunity? 
Circle one:     Yes          No 
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Section 3 
The Two Round Game 
Description of the Game and Rules:  
In this game your goal is to get as many points as you can. These points will then be 
converted into raffle tickets after the experiment is done such that the more points you 
have the more raffle tickets you receive.  Everyone will receive at least 1 ticket. 
In the table below there are 17 rows. In each row you have the option to either gamble 
for points or take a sure value of points. You must indicate at each row whether you 
want to gamble, G, or take the sure value, S. After everyone has filled in their tables, a 
random number based on the number of rows in the game table will be drawn using a 
random number generator. Everyone will receive the payoff they chose associated with 
whatever row is chosen by the random number generator. For example in the practice 
table below, if the number drawn is 2 and I chose to gamble at row 2, then I would 
gamble. If I chose sure value, I would receive 2 points.  
The researcher will flip a coin for each person who gambled. Heads is a win, tails is a loss. 
To better understand the game, we will do a practice round. This round will not count 
towards your point total, it is simply to help you understand the game before we play 
for real. 
 
Row 
Number 
Gamble Receive 
Sure Value 
Choice 
(S or G) 
1 50/50 chance to win 6 points 1 point  
2 50/50 chance to win 6 points 2 points  
3 50/50 chance to win 6 points 3 points  
4 50/50 chance to win 6 points 4 points  
5 50/50 chance to win 6 points 5 points  
G = GAMBLE 
S = SURE VALUE 
Practice Round RESULT: 
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We will play the game all together round by round.   
 
Round 1 
Row 
Number 
Gamble Receive 
Sure Value 
Choice 
(S or G) 
1 50/50 chance to win 20 points 0 points  
2 50/50 chance to win 20 points 1 points  
3 50/50 chance to win 20 points 2 points  
4 50/50 chance to win 20 points 3 points  
5 50/50 chance to win 20 points 4 points  
6 50/50 chance to win 20 points 5 points  
7 50/50 chance to win 20 points 6 points  
8 50/50 chance to win 20 points 7 points  
9 50/50 chance to win 20 points 8 points  
10 50/50 chance to win 20 points 9 points  
11 50/50 chance to win 20 points 10 points  
12 50/50 chance to win 20 points 11 points  
13 50/50 chance to win 20 points 12 points  
14 50/50 chance to win 20 points 13 points  
15 50/50 chance to win 20 points 14 points  
16 50/50 chance to win 20 points 15 points  
17 50/50 chance to win 20 points 16 points  
 
G = GAMBLE 
S = SURE VALUE 
Round 1 RESULT:_________ 
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Round 2 
Row 
Number 
Gamble Receive 
Sure Value 
Choice 
(S or G) 
1 50/50 chance to win 20 points 0 points  
2 50/50 chance to win 20 points 1 points  
3 50/50 chance to win 20 points 2 points  
4 50/50 chance to win 20 points 3 points  
5 50/50 chance to win 20 points 4 points  
6 50/50 chance to win 20 points 5 points  
7 50/50 chance to win 20 points 6 points  
8 50/50 chance to win 20 points 7 points  
9 50/50 chance to win 20 points 8 points  
10 50/50 chance to win 20 points 9 points  
11 50/50 chance to win 20 points 10 points  
12 50/50 chance to win 20 points 11 points  
13 50/50 chance to win 20 points 12 points  
14 50/50 chance to win 20 points 13 points  
15 50/50 chance to win 20 points 14 points  
16 50/50 chance to win 20 points 15 points  
17 50/50 chance to win 20 points 16 points  
 
G = GAMBLE 
S = SURE VALUE 
Round 2 RESULT:_________ 
 
Total Earnings:__________ 
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Figure C: Consent Form 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Researchers: Edward Yonkers, Professor Amanda Felkey (Adviser to thesis) 
Purpose of Research: This study is designed to see how decision-making behavior changes. 
Specific Procedures to be Used: Participants will answer a series of questions in three distinct phases. The first phase 
will be to record a subjective response to a described situation. The second phase will be to record simple 
demographic data. The final phase will be a two round game in which participants try to maximize points. Points are 
earned by strategically choosing a level of risk the participant is willing to take on. Each round will be exactly the same. 
Points will be converted into raffle tickets at the end of the game.   
 
Duration of Participation: The duration of the experiment is generally about 20 minutes. 
Benefits to the Individual: Participants have a chance to win a raffle. The participants will also acquire knowledge 
concerning the developing field of Behavioral Economics.   
Risks to the Individual: Participants may experience negative emotional responses from the game section of this 
survey if they perceive their performance poorly. These feelings are likely to be temporary, but if they become 
unpleasant you are encouraged to leave the experiment. 
Compensation: Participants will be rewarded with raffle tickets based on how well they do. Raffle prize: $50 
Walgreens gift card. Raffle winner will be announced before the end of the semester depending on when data 
collection is completed, and December 11th by the latest.  
Confidentiality: Note that this study is not anonymous because the researcher knows who participated. However, no 
single participant’s data will be linked to any identifying characteristics such as name, student ID or other identifying 
numbers under any circumstances in the discussion of the results. Data analysis will focus on group averages rather 
than individuals’ performances.  Before beginning the survey, you will hand in this consent form so that your data 
cannot be linked to your name.   
Voluntary Nature of Participation: No one is required to take part in this study.  If you agree to take part, you may 
leave the study at any time you wish without penalty.  
Human Subject Statement: If you have any questions about this study, you may contact Edward Yonkers (603-717-
2466, yonkerseh@mx.lakeforest.edu). If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please 
feel free to contact the co-chairs of the Human Subjects Review Committee, Dr. Sergio Guglielmi, at 
guglielmi@lakeforest.edu (847-735-5260), or Dr. Naomi Wentworth, at wentworth@lakeforest.edu (847-735-5256) 
I HAVE FULLY READ THIS CONSENT FORM AND UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENTS. I HAVE ALSO HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STUDY, AND I AGREE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY. 
______________________________________________                                              ________________________ 
                Participant’s Signature                                                                                                               Date 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                Participant’s Name and email (to be contacted for raffle) 
__________________________________________                                                      _________________________ 
               Researcher’s Signature                                                                                                               Date 
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Figure D: Debriefing Form 
Debriefing: The Power of Information Experimental Survey 
What is the general aim of this research? 
The general aim of this research is to see how people respond differently to situations based on 
whether or not they were expecting that situation.  There were two versions of this survey, A 
and B. In version A, the hypothetical situation says your adviser did not predict the change. In 
version B, the adviser did predict the change. In both versions the changes were of equal 
amount.  In version A participants are told ahead of time that they will lose 12 points after 
round 1 in the game. In version B participants are not told ahead of time that they will lose 12 
points after round 1 in the game. The hypothesis is that the responses that participants in 
groups A and B give to each question will not be the same. 
What kind of research is this? 
This is experimental research. The independent variable is whether or not one had prior 
information that a loss was going to occur.   
What areas of Economics does this research expand on or illustrate? 
This research would fall into the Behavioral Economics region of study as it is concerned 
primarily with how we make decisions, and specifically how risk preferences might change in 
response to new information. The theory driving this research is based primarily on prospect 
theory, a Nobel Prize winning theory which, among many other things, provides a model for why 
people’s risk preferences might change.  This theory has led to an entire field of new and 
developing research. The goal of this study is to show that simply having prior knowledge of an 
event can change how we view and react to that event when it occurs as opposed to when it is a 
surprise.    
Where can I learn more about this particular topic or research like it? 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
Econometrica  
Vol. 47, No. 2 (Mar., 1979) , pp. 263-292  
Published by: The Econometric Society 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914185 
 
How expectations affect reference point formation: an experimental investigation 
Andreas Hack and Frauke von Bieberstein 
Review of Managerial Science 
Vol. 9, Issue 1 (Jan., 2014), pp. 33-59 
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Stable URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11846-014-0121-0/fulltext.html 
Who is supervising this research and how can I contact them? 
Edward Yonkers, a senior at Lake Forest College, is conducting the research. You can contact him 
by email at yonkerseh@mx.lakeforest.edu or by phone at 603-717-2466. Dr. Amanda J Felkey is 
the adviser to Edward Yonkers’s thesis. You can reach her by email at felkey@lakeforest.edu. 
You can also contact the co-chairs of the Human Subjects Committee, Dr. Naomi Wentworth at 
wentworth@lakeforest.edu (847-735-5256) and Dr. Sergio Guglielmi, at 
guglielmi@lakeforest.edu (847-735-5260). 
How long has the investigator been studying this specific topic? 
Edward Yonkers has been an Economics major since his freshman year but began the 
preliminary research for his thesis and this topic in particular last semester.  This is his first time 
conducting research of this sort. 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this survey. This type of research is not possible 
without your support, so we are truly grateful for your time and effort.  
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Figure E: Experimental Script 
[Before beginning, split survey copies into two pile and give to either ends of the classroom. 
Tell the students: “Take one and pass it along. Do not look beyond the front page until 
instructed to do so.” Once everyone has a copy, begin: 
 Hello everyone, 
My name is Ned Yonkers, and I am a senior currently writing a thesis for Economics.  Your 
professor has been gracious enough to allow me some time to come into your class and collect 
responses for my survey. Participation in this survey is completely voluntary, but those who 
participate have a chance to win a $50 Walgreens gift card.  If you wish to participate, please 
follow along as I read the consent form. 
[Read consent form] 
Are there any questions about the study so far? 
If you agree to the following statement, please fill out the consent form and pass it forward.  
[Read consent statement] 
 [After all consent forms are gathered, read the survey] 
 [Cue page flips throughout survey, and say “This concludes Section (x)” at the end of each section. Ask 
students “Is everyone done answering?” when it appears they are ready to move on] 
SECTION 3: During practice round, explain any confusion about the rules or how to fill in the 
table. When announcing the result of gambles, start with front left corner and work 
rightwards, then go to the left side of the next row back when the last person of the current 
row has been reached.  Have gamblers raise their hands after the conclusion of each round.] 
FOR SURVEY B: “I did not tell you this before we began, but before we begin round two of the 
game, you must subtract 12 points from your point total, even if this gives you a negative score.   
[At the conclusion of the survey, say: “Thank you to everyone who participated.  The final paper 
is for you to take with you. It explains into more detail what this research is. Please do not 
discuss the contents of this study with your peers, as they may become participants as well! As 
you come to hand in your papers, show me your total at the end of the game, and I will 
distribute your raffle tickets.” 
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Figure F: Unhappiness Distribution 
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